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1. Introduction
Is the wage structure too rigid? Since the mid-1970s, this question has
been one of the most persistent themes of the economic policy debate in
West Germany. In recent months, the question is asked with a new sense
of urgency: after the political and economic unification of the country in
1990, a huge imbalance between the labour markets in the West and the
post-communist East will be a fact of life for years to come so that
common sense and economics speak in favour of a sustained interregional
wage differentiation. However, actual wage agreements, which mostly
envisage an equalization of wages between West and East by the
mid-1990s, do not take this need for flexibility into account.
In this paper, we shall take a fresh look at the empirical evidence on
structural wage rigidity for the last four decades of economic history in
West Germany. We shall do so by applying some more recently developed
techniques of co-integration, which provide a useful framework for the
economectric analysis of structural labour market disequilibria and their
wage effects. While the subject of our inquiry is the West German labour
market since the early 1950s, the results do have implications for what
one might expect for the future in a united Germany which has taken
over basically all institutional features of the West's so-called social
market economy, including the predominance of collective bargaining in
wage determination.
The paper consists of six parts. After the introduction (Part 1), we
shall briefly discuss some major theoretical issues which are linked to the
definition of structural wage rigidity (Part 2). The basic framework for
the subsequent empirical analysis is set in Part 3; it is then applied to
interregional wage rigidity in Part 4 and to intersectoral/interindustrial
wage rigidity in Part 5. The paper is concluded with a few remarks on
the relevance of our analysis for the ongoing economic policy debate on
wage differentiation in Germany (Part 6).- 2 -
2. The Rigidity of the Wage Structure: Some Conceptual Issues
To make economic sense, the term 'wage rigidity' must be defined with
reference to some sort of labour market disequilibrium. In the case of
the wage level, the relevant disequilibrium is rather easy to identify as
the economy-wide excess supply of labour and to approximate, e.g., by
the overall unemployment rate. In the case of the wage structure, things
are more complex. As there is a widespread confusion in the literature
about the terminology and the concept of structural rigidities, it is
worthwhile to pursue this matter in some detail.
Let us begin with four very general postulates on the wage structure of
an economy:
(i) Whenever there is no Keynesian and no classical unemployment in
the economy as a whole, there must be some equilibrium structure
of wages which is compatible with full employment, i. e. , which
conforms to the multitude of full employment value productivities of
labour all over the economy (neglecting cases of zero or negative
labour productivity). Clearly, this is an implication of Walrasian
general equilibrium theory under the usual set of convexity
assumptions.
(ii) Technological progress and intersectoral shifts of demand in goods
markets - not the least due to changes in the international division
of labour - may lead to revaluations of human capital in the
economy; thus the structure of value productivities of labour at
full employment is likely to be changed and with it the equilibrium
structure of wages. If the actual wage structure does not
adequately reflect any such change, then occupational, sectoral
and/or regional disequilibria may emerge. The extent and the
speed of any subsequent adjustment of the actual towards the
equilibrium wage structure can sensibly be called the degree of
structural wage flexibility, or conversely, the degree of structural
wage rigidity.
(iii) In a very general sense, the revaluation of human capital in the
course of structural change in goods markets is a mere- 3 -
consequence of some sort of labour immobility: if workers were able
to change occupations, sectors and/or regions without incurring
frictional costs in the broad sense of the term, then no change of
the wage structure would be required to preserve full employment.
In practice, however, there will be costs - presumably moderate
ones in the case of sectors, higher ones in the case of regions,
and often prohibitive ones in the case of occupations. In any case,
the degree of mobility is likely to be a function of time: the more
time elapses after an exogenous productivity or terms-of-trade
shock to the structure of human capital values, the more likely it
is - ceteris paribus - that the full employment structure of wages
returns to the standard of normality since the quantity movements
of labour across sectoral, regional and/or occupational boundaries
as a reaction to wage incentives gradually dissipate the rental
element in the full employment wage structure. To the extent that
labour mobility can be expected to remove the disequilibrium in the
long run, the rigidity of the actual wage structure boils down to a
short- and medium-term phenomenon. Hence, the relevant questions
to ask are the following ones: is the wage structure flexible
enough to accomodate shocks which lead to temporary structural
disequilibria? Does it allow to save jobs in any sector hit hard by
a negative shock and thus give the respective workforce the
'breathing space' to search for valuable alternative employment
opportunities without becoming unemployed?
(iv) Of course, the alternative to labour moving to where the jobs are
created is that the new jobs, i. e the new complementary capital
stock, moves to labour. If we realistically assume a fairly perfect
capital market, in which rates of return are more or less equalized
across feasible uses, and if we further exclude the possibility of
deliberate government manipulation of the price of capital through
subsidies, then the only instrument to achieve a redirection of
capital is the flexibility of the wage structure which - ceteris
paribus - determines the relative profitability of investment
between the relevant structural units. Clearly, the higher the
costs of labour mobility, the more one has to rely on the movement
of capital to reach again full employment all over the economy. In
the extreme - say, e.g., with labour being completely immobile- 4 -
between regions - capital alone has to shoulder the burden of
adjustment.
Prima facie, these four postulates look like fairly innocent truisms which
could hardly arouse any controversy. After all, price and quantity
movements are considered to be substitutes almost everywhere in
economics. Nevertheless, the postulates have implications which are in
conflict with some common arguments in the economic policy debate and
- still more importantly - with the thrust of empirical tests of
interindustrial and interregional rigidities of the wage structure.
As to economic policy, it is often claimed that structural wage flexibility
of whatever kind is likely to hinder or slow down structural change of
employment: with wages reacting to sectoral disequilibria, the expanding
sectors raise and the contracting sectors lower wages so that - compared
to a situation with no wage differentiation - employment in the expanding
sectors grows slower and employment in the contracting sectors shrinks
2 slower as the 'wage burden' is distributed 'pro-structurally'. This
argument misses the message of our postulates (iii) and (iv) and thereby
confuses cause and effect: only if the mobility of labour and capital is
insufficient at the given wage structure to bring about the required
intersectoral dislocation of labour will a change of this very structure be
required as a substitute (and incentive) for higher mobility. Preventing
this - purely instrumental - wage flexibility to emerge boils down to a
strategy of pushing relatively immobile workers into a state of
unemployment in which they are (assumed to be) ready to switch
sectors. By implication, the workers regard the state of unemployment as
less desirable than the state of employment at a lower wage in their
'old' sector since they leave the former, but do not leave the latter. The
state of unemployment is thus used as a deliberate weapon to force
Usually, the case is made with respect to the intersectoral wage
structure, but - with a few non-essential modifications - it carries
over to other 'structural units', notably regions.
2 See, e.g., Bell, Freeman (1985), pp. 17-18, Franz, (1989),
pp. 309-311, and the Ifo-Institute, Munich, as quoted by Donges,
Schmidt et al. (1988), p. 190.- 5 -
reluctant workers into moving. In fact, this is the core of the famous
'Swedish-' or 'Rehn/Meidner-model' of structural change at a constant
intersectoral wage structure in which the state of unemployment is
sweatened for workers by a partial socialisation of mobility costs.
In practice, which of the two strategies of structural change is preferred
- the 'individualistic' one via wage differentiation or the 'socialist' one
via government-sponsored unemployment - is largely a matter of ideolo-
gical taste, not of economic substance: liberals with a preference for
market solutions usually favour the former, social democrats with a
preference for wage equalisation lean towards the latter. Note, however,
that there is no apriori case for any of the two variants in terms of
structural adjustment speed: it is a purely empirical question whether
intersectoral wage flexibility or government-sponsored unemployment
makes the labour force be relocated faster from shrinking to expanding
sectors. To our knowledge, this question has not been tackled rigorously
in the empirical literature on structural change. In any case, it is beside
the point to argue that wage flexibility per se may hinder structural
change of employment: clearly, the flexibility; of the wage structure is a
possible instrument of structural adjustment to be compared in its
efficiency with other instruments such as a deliberate socialisation of
4
mobility costs of the unemployed.
For the Rehn-Meidner model, see the concise summary by Lundberg
(1985), pp. 17-18.
Some authors (notably Bell, Freeman 1985, pp. 17-18) argue that an
explicit distinction should be made between two kinds of structural
wage flexibility, namely the flexibility in the wake of an intersectoral
shift of product demand and the flexibility in response to intersectoral
differences in productivity growth which are due to purely
technological reasons. The former is regarded to be conducive to
overall employment growth in any case since it serves as an instrument
to spur intersectoral movements of labour in the sense described above
in the text; in contrast, the latter is considered to be ambiguous in its
effect on employment growth since an above-average wage rise in the
sector with fast productivity growth may dampen employment growth in
this sector by more than the corresponding wage moderation in the
sector with slow productivity growth helps to save jobs.
This analytical distinction between two qualities of wage differentiation- 6 -
As to empirical testing, the question arises what kind of framework can
and should be used to estimate the extent of structural wage rigidity in
the sense defined above. Traditionally, 'wage flexibility' has been
measured by simply calculating some proxy of the structural wage
dispersion and then analyzing its changes over time. The results of this
procedure have in general been quite unambiguous, at least for the case
of West Germany: all over the last twenty years, the wage dispersion
among industries, between industry and services and between different
levels of qualification of the workforce have been notably constant. If
anything, a slight trend towards equalisation is discernible for the early
1970s and a slight reverse trend for recent years, but the thrust of the
evidence points towards a constant structure. From this, it has been
is misleading: in a standard neoclassical model with two sectors, which
basically underlies all arguments on intersectoral wage flexibility and
differentiation, any exogenous shock at given wages has an effect on
sectoral labour demand only via the intersectoral ratio of marginal
value productivities of labour, no matter whether the shock originates
in technology and is transmitted through the ratio of physical
productivities or whether it originates in goods markets and is
transmitted through output prices. In either case, the sector
experiencing the rise of value productivity has the scope to expand
employment at the given wage and thus to attract labour by offering
higher wages, while the sector with the relative loss comes under
pressure to release workers; in either case, the adjustment requires a
temporary wage differentiation to the extent that intersectoral labour
mobility is less than perfect. Hence it makes no sense to link the
employment effects of wage differentiation to the nature or type of the
original exogenous shock.
Note also that, whatever the shock may have been in the first place,
the only economic rationale for a subsequent wage differentiation is to
preserve full employment in the case of insufficient intersectoral
mobility at the given wage structure. Then, however, it is a moot
question whether - without wage differentiation - more jobs could be
created in the expanding sector than would be lost in the contracting
one; after all, without appropriate wage incentives (or, for that
matter, a Swedish-style subsidization of mobility), released workers in
the contracting sector will not fill the job slots in the expanding part
of the economy, and thus actual employment will be lower without than
with intersectoral wage flexibility. Clearly, the employment performance
of an economy should be measured by the standard of the actual
number of jobs, not of the job potential, which would have been
realised if workers had been more mobile.
5 See Breithaupt, Soltwedel (1980), Bell, Freeman (1985), Gundlach
(1986), Soltwedel (1988), Soltwedel, Trapp (1988), Franz (1989), and
- with a somewhat different focus of research - Fels, Gundlach (1990).— 7 —
concluded that much of the lament about structural rigidities is grossly
overdone.
In our view, this conclusion is not warranted simply because the empi-
rical tests do not address - let alone answer - the relevant question.
What the evidence in fact shows is that there has been no sustained
trend towards a flattening or a stratification of the wage structure.
However, the evidence says virtually nothing about the crucial issue
whether this very structure did or did not react to temporary or
permanent disequilibria in specific labour (sub-)markets.
On a technical level, the testing design of this type of evidence is based
on the implicit assumption that a rise (decline) of wage differentiation
across sectors/regions in a descriptive sense can serve as a reliable
indicator for wage flexibility in the economic sense defined above. Quite
obviously, however, it cannot, as the example of structural change in
the West German economy in the last 20 years easily shows: if, e. g. , the
real wage across industries at time t,. is positively correlated with the
physical labour productivity (which, in turn, is determined i. a. by the
capital intensity of production!), and if the industries with relatively
high physical labour productivity suffer intersectoral terms-of-trade
losses in the course of structural change from t~ to t-, then the full
employment wage structure with an immobile labour force becomes less
dispersed, i.e., the high (physical) productivity industry should lose at
least some of its wage lead. Note that this is basically what happened
after 1973 with the partial decline of the West German heavy industries
which are traditionally high productivity and high wage sectors. The
same argument holds mutatis mutandis for regions if structural change
favours a traditionally low wage area. Again, examples from the economic
history of West Germany are easy to find: the decline of highly
industrialized, high-wage Northrhine-Westfalia and the concommittant rise
of (relatively) low-wage Bavaria may have called for less interregional
wage differentiation to mitigate 'perverse' migration incentives.
6 See in particular Franz (1989), pp. 325-326.- 8 -
Behind this 'technical' deficiency, there is a deep conceptual fallacy: as
the usual measures describe the extent of wage differentiation without
any consideration of sectoral/reg ional labour market disequilibria, they
must by construction remain blind to the core of the matter, namely the
link between sectoral/reg ional wage dynamics and sectoral regional labour
market disequilibria. In short: they miss what wage flexibility really
ought to mean.
3. A Framework for Empirical Analysis
A stylized model of intersectoral wage flexibility may clarify, this crucial
point and redirect the analysis into the right channels. Note that, in the
following theoretical paragraph, we use the term 'sector' in a broad
sense, meaning either sectors of economic activity ('industries') or
regions. Let the process of wage determination in an economy be
described by the simple equation
(1) log (w/p)t = -Tj zt + et
where w denotes the aggregate wage level, p the aggregate price level,
7
z a measure of aggregate excess supply in the labour market (possibly
the unemployment rate or the log thereof), rj a constant parameter
(17 £ 0), e a random error term, and the subscript t the point in time,
i.e. with annual data the relevant year. Equation (1) may be regarded
g
as a long-run wage equation in a bargaining-type model. Let the
corresponding wage equation for any sector i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) be given
by
(2) log (w/p)^ = Vzt - 9
i(z
i-z)t + e^
For the moment, we simply assume that there is something like a
relevant labour market, both for the economy as a whole and for any
sector. We shall return to this important matter below.
g
See, e.g., most papers in Calmfors (1990).- 9 -
with the superscript i identifying the sectoral variables ((w/p)
1, z
1) and
parameters (17 , 8 i 0). Let the sector i - whether an industry or a
region - be small enough to make w/p and 2 independent of any single
i i 9
(w/p) and z (for i = 1,2, ...,n). Equation (2) allows for different
combinations of sectoral wage flexibility with respect to aggregate and
sectoral labour market disequilibria. E.g., for r) > 0 and 9=0, the
sectoral real wage reacts exclusively to aggregate disequilibria, not to
specifically sectoral ones, i.e. not to that part of z which goes beyond
or falls short of z (meaning z^z); conversely, for 77
1 = 0 and 9
1 > 0, it
is only the specifically sectoral disequilibrium that matters, and not the
aggregate one; for 17 = 9 , the sectoral real wage reacts to just the
'whole' sectoral disequilbrium (z ) which, however, may to some extent
merely reflect an aggregate disequilibrium (z) as typically happens in
cyclical upswings and downturns that hit the economy as a whole. Of
course, any other combination of 17 and 9 is feasible provided that TJ
1,
9 > 0. Intuitively, it is quite obvious that the key to the matter of
intersectoral wage rigidity or flexibility lies in the parameter 8 : if - in
an appropriately designed econometric setting which specifies long-run as
well as short- and medium-run dynamic effects -, the 8
1 turns out to be
zero or close to zero, the sectoral wage can- be regarded as 'rigid' with
respect to specifically sectoral labour market disequilibria. If 9 turns
out significant and relatively high, then a fair amount of structural wage
flexibility can be diagnosed.
Although extremely stylized and simplified, the above two equations dp
catch the essence of what structural wage flexibility and rigidity should
sensibly mean according to our line of thought in the preceeding
paragraph. This can best be seen by combining (1) and (2) in the
equation
(3) log (w/p)t




with v, = e, - e,
1. Plausibly enough, equation (3) states that the real
wage differential between sector i and the aggregate depends first on the
This is not a crucial assumption. Dropping it would complicate the
analysis, but not alter the main line of reasoning.- 10 -
aggregate labour market disequilibrium z, - to the extent that the
sectoral and the aggregate real wage differ in flexibility with respect to
z. - and second on the specifically sectoral disequilibrium (z -z), - to
the extent that the sectoral real wage reacts to the sectoral
disequilibrium.
Under two supplementary assumptions, which are fairly innocent,
equation (3) can be further simplified: (i) let p.
1 = p., i.e. the price
level with which the nominal wage is deflated, is assumed to be the same
all across the country. For all that matters in practice, this restriction
makes good sense: if p is taken to be the consumer price index, there
are simply no separate indices defined and available for the various
relevant sectors, be they industries or regions of an economy. As to the
short-run dynamics of nominal wages in the wake of price changes which
is not specified in equation (3), it is also quite reasonable to assume
that there are no differences in the sectoral lag structures: after all,
why should, say, Bavarian workers, firms, and unions be more or less
inflation-sensitive than their counterparts in Hesse or Lower Saxony?
Hence the intersectoral difference in real wages and their changes over
time can quite safely be approximated by the intersectoral differential in
nominal wage terms, (ii) In a similar vein, we can assume that 17 = 17,
i.e. the extent of wage flexibility/rigidity with respect to aggregate
disequilibria is imposed to be the same all across the economy. Again,
the rationale is intuitively plausible: why should we expect any relevant
agent in, say again, Bavaria to react differently to a common aggregate
shock than his/her counterpart in other regions? Apart from this a priori
consideration, more practical econometric arguments call for imposing the
restriction 17 = 17: in most estimates of various specifications of this
stylized model, it proved difficult enough to identify the parameter 9
even with the restriction applied; in fact, a simultaneous identification of
(77 -17) and 9 turned out virtually impossible due to the all too limited
informational content of the time-series data used. As far as the general
form of (3) was taken as the basis for estimation, the results pointed
towards an insignificant parameter (17-17).




1 - log w^ = -9
1(z
1-z)t +- 11 -
which simply says that the deviation of the wage in sector i from the
aggregate wage is a negative function of the difference in the degree of
excess labour supply between sector i and the economy as a whole. It is
important to recognize how the parameter 9 should be interpreted,
independent of the precise definitions of the variables w and z which will
be discussed below. Taken at face value, 0
1 measures the marginal effect
of a change in the deviation of the sectoral extent from the aggregate
extent of labour market disequilibrium on the (log-) deviation of the
sectoral from the aggregate wage level. Whether this marginal effect is of
a short- or medium-run or of a long-run nature crucially depends on the
time-series properties of the two relevant variables log(w /w), and
(z -z),. If these two variables are stationary, i. e. if they have a
constant mean over time, 6 boils down to a measure of short- or
medium-run flexibility, independent of how the dynamics of the equation
is specified for actual estimation purposes: after any exogenous shock
changing (z -z)., the economy will eventually return to the long-run
equilibrium wage ratio (w /w),. If the relevant variables are
non-stationary, things are more complex: provided the variables are
integrated of the same degree, say degree one (difference stationarity),
short- and long-run effects may be discernible if the variables are
co-integrated, i.e. if they share a stochastic trend. An estimation in
levels such as in equation (4) would then become a test for
co-integration, 9 would have to be interpreted as a long-run coefficient;
an additional equation which appropriately specifies the short- and the
medium-run dynamics would then serve as a framework to estimate the
short- and the medium-run effects of (z -z), on (w /w),. We shall return
10 to this matter below when discussing actual specification issues.
Although a most useful analytical starting-point, equation (4) is unduely
restrictive in one important way which deserves some closer examination.
Rewriting (4), we obtain
For summaries of the economic meaning of the statistical concepts
referred to in the text, see Granger (1986), Hendry (1986), and
Stock, Watson (1988). Note that, of course, the variants described do
not exhaust the range of possible time series constellations.- 12 -
(5) log wt = log wt - 9
1(z
1-z)t + v,.
This reformulation makes clear that, if the variable log(wVw), in
equation (4) is to be stationary and if both logCw,
1) and log(w, ) are
non-stationary, which is most likely to be the case in view of the rapid
wage growth over any sample period of post-war economic history in West
Germany, then log(w, ) and log(w.) have to be co-integrated with a
long-run coefficient which exactly equals one. Conversely, if log(wVw),
turns out to be non-stationary, this may simply be a reflection of a false
restriction on the long-run coefficient, which in reality is not equal to
one. There are important economic issues hidden behind this formal
matter: clearly, any changes of variables which determine wages in the
long run and which are not included in the equation, may lead to a
systematic deviation of the sectoral wage from the aggregate wage level,
independent of any sectoral disequilibria. E.g., the average wage in
region i may fall back relative to the economy-wide average, if - ceteris
paribus - the industrial structure of the regional economy gradually
shifts towards relatively low productivity branches; or the average wage
in, say, industry i may increase if - again ceteris paribus - the average
level of qualification and pay of the workforce in this industry rises
relative to the economy-wide average. As far as the use of wage indices
which correct for this kind of structural effects, is not feasible due to
data limitations, some systematic long-run changes of the wage
differential between an industry or region and the economy as a whole is
very likely to be oberservable in the long-run.
To account for these effects, a generalized version of equation (4) and
(5) is used, namely
(6) log wt
x = e^





1^ 0) and 9 (0 *> 0) denoting the long-run co-integration
parameters of log(w, ) with log(w.) and (z-z), respectively. Again,
different cases may be distinguished: (i) log(w, ) and log(w, ) are
non-stationary, but co-integrated. In this case, 0R is the long-run
co-integration parameter, so that [log (w, ) - 0« log (w,)] is stationary.
If (z
X-z), is also stationary, 0 * measures the short- and medium-run
effect of the specifically sectoral labour market disequilbrium on theBib.liothek
des Instituts fur Weltwirtschaf.
- 13 -
(stationary) variable [logCw,
1) - 0* log(w,)].. If, in turn, (z
X-z). is
non-stationary, 0 will be zero; this follows from the fact that log(w.
X)
and log(w,) are co-integrated so that (z -z), - while itself integrated -
cannot be co-integrated with either log(w*) or log(w.) or a linear
combination of the two. (ii) All variables are non-stationary, and
log(w, ) is co-integrated with the linear combination
[0Rlog(w,) - 0 (z
1-z).] where both 0fi and 9
 X measure long-run effects
with a seperate equation defining the short-run dynamics. Other
constellations may be thought of, but need not concern us here.
So much for the general framework of empirical analysis. Before we turn
to the details of the model to be estimated, we have yet to clear up what
the sectoral labour market disequilibrium should really mean and thus
how (z -z) should in principle be proxied. To tackle this question, one
has to make an explicit distinction between the two types of structural
units considered in this paper, notably regions on the one side and
sectors in the narrow sense (or 'industries') on the other.
As to regions, the answer to the question is straightforward and hardly
controversial: as long as labour mobility between the relevant regions
can be assumed to be low enough to justify the assumption of a more or
less exogenous regional labour supply at any point in time, the region's
unemployment rate (or the log thereof) can be taken as. an adequate
disequilibrium variable. As a consequence, the specifically regional
component of unemployment can be taken to be the difference (or, for
that matter, the log-difference) of the particular regional and the
national unemployment rate.
As to sectors and industries, the question is somewhat more complex.
Clearly, a sector of economic activity like an industry does per se have
no genuine labour market as have geographic entities like a country or a
state. Instead, structural change evokes a persistent reshuffling of
labour between industries, with the labour mobility at a given wage
structure across the relevant units being much greater than in the case
All throughout this paper, the unemployment rate is defined as the
share of registered unemployed persons in the total labour force.- 14 -
of regions. This is the corollary of saying that the degree of human
capital specificity is much higher in regional than in sectoral terms.
Hence, on a more practical empirical level, no such thing as a sector's
labour supply can be reasonably defined and thus no unemployment rate
as a proxy for the underutilization of that supply can be calculated.
Nevertheless, industrial crises (booms) involving large-scale lay-offs
(hirings) are plain facts of experience; and it is no moot question to ask
whether and to what extent the short- or medium-term fluctuations of
sectoral economic activity are accompanied by likewise wage movements
which may temporarily mitigate the quantity adjustments.
It is important to realize that industrial or sectoral crises can hardly be
anything else than short- or medium-term phenomena. In the long-run, a
large-scale lay-off of industrial workers will lead either to their
re-absorption in other sectors of the economy, or to a greater pool of
long-term unemployed which then cannot be assigned any more to a
specific industry. This is the very consequence of the economic logic of
structural change: as soon as an industry or a sector has shrunk to a
competitive size, its 'historical' workforce cannot be taken any more as a
sensible reference standard defining an 'industrial' or 'sectoral'
unemployment which, in the extreme, would be perpetuated indefinitely.
Also, any rationale for an intersectoral wage differentiation to accomodate
the process of structural change would disappear in the long-run. In
statistical terms, all this means that any measure of industrial or sectoral
labour market disequilibrium (z -z) must be defined relative to some
'normal' or trend path of structural change, i.e. (z-z) must by
definition be trend stationary and its effect on the sectoral wage must be
constrained to be zero in the long-run. We shall develop such-like
measures below when specifying the actual model to be estimated.
In this context, it is essential to have a very precise idea of the subtle
difference between intersectoral and interregional wage flexibility/
rigidity. After an industry has gone through a crisis and finally reached
a new (smaller) competitive size, any economic rationale for this industry
to pay lower wages than others to facilitate adjustment is also gone.
Nevertheless, if the respective industrial crisis has been geographically
concentrated and if, as a long-term consequence of this very crisis, a
particular region is left with a permanently higher unemployment rate- 15 -
relative to some aggregate standard, then a long-term regional wage
differentiation is called for. To pick a historical example: if the
adjustment crisis in the steel industry all over Germany in the -early
1980's had left the state of Northrhine-Westfalia, which hosts the Ruhr
valley steel industry, with a permanently higher regional unemployment
rate relative to the national average, an economic case can be made for a
general long-term wage differentiation between Northrhine-Westfalia and
the rest of the country, but not for a long-term wage differentiation
between the steel industry per se and other industries. In a sense,
Northrhine-Westfalia would have to 'devalue' its labour force across the
board to attract the capital necessary to cut back its unemployment rate
to the level before the crisis or to induce a corresponding emigration of
a part of its workforce to other regions of the country.
4. Interregional Wage Rigidity
We now elaborate a more specific model for estimation purposes. To start
with, we shall focus on interregional wage rigidity, i. e. we shall try to
give an econometric answer to the question whether and to what extent
the wage structure across regional units (in West Germany until 1989:
the eleven states) has reacted in the past to specifically regional labour
market disequilibria, be they temporary or permanent.
4. 1. Model Specification
To arrive at a model which basically displays the desired long-run
characteristics of (6), we assume that the wage at time t in any region i
12 is determined within the general dynamic framework
(7) log wt
X = aQ + a1 log w^
1 + /3Q log wt + &1 log w^ + . . .
1
2 See Hendry, Pagan, Sargan, (1984), pp. 1041-1049, and Rudel
(1989), pp. 28-37 with a discussion of various types of models which
can be derived by imposing different sets of restrictions on the
parameters of an equation of type (7).- 16 -
with w defined as the wage in region i, w as the wage in the economy
as a whole, and (z -z) as the specifically regional labour market
disequilibrium. The superscript i denotes the region, the superscript t
the point in time; a-, a-, /3Q, /3.., Y_ and T- are constant parameters,
and e is a random error term. Note that equation (7) is defined for any
region i so that, in principle, all six parameters should also carry a
superscript i which we leave out to keep the notation as simple as
possible.
For estimation purposes, equation (7) can conveniently be rewritten in
two alternative versions, namely (i) the generalized error-correction
model leading towards a two-step estimation procedure as first proposed
13 by Engle/Granger (EG), and (ii) what may be called the
Wickens/Breusch-model (WB) which involves a one-step estimation
14 procedure using instrumental variables.
(i) By some algebraic manipulations of (7), we obtain
(8) A log w^ = /3Q A log wt + 7Q A (z*-z)t - ...
... - (l~
a-i) t log w, - 0 - 9R log w, - 9 (z -z), 1 ] + e,
with 0 = a^/il-a^), 9R = (f5Q+f5^)/(l-a~) and 9 = (rQ+r-)/(1-a.,) being
the long-run multipliers or co-integration parameters. Comparing the
formal structure of (8) and (6), it becomes clear that the term in
brackets on the right-hand side of (8) is equivalent to the lagged error
term in (6), with the minor difference that (8) has a constant term (0 )
while (6) has not. Following Engle/Granger, equation (8) can be
estimated using a two-step procedure. In the first step, the term in
brackets is calculated by running a co-integration regression of the form
(9) log w.
1 = 9 + 9R log w, + 0 (z
1-z). + v.
1
3 See Engle, Granger (1987).
1
4 See Wickens, Breusch (1987).- 17 -
which yields consistent estimates of the long-run multipliers 9 , 8R and
0 . Equation (9) can be estimated using ordinary least squares. In a
second step, the short-run dynamics is specified in the form of
equation (8) with the bracketed term replaced by the lagged error term
v, 1 from (8), i.e.
(10) A log wt* = j3Q A log wt + 7Q A (z
X-z)t - (1-c^) v^ + et
which yields consistent estimates of all relevant short-run coefficients.
Again, ordinary least squares can be used. Note that (10) is an equation
without a constant term since the long-run constant 9 = af./(l-a1) has
been estimated in the first step (equation (9)) so that the short-run
constant a_ is identified with the help of the autogressive parameter a...
Estimating a co-integration equation like (8) makes only sense if the
variable log(w, ) is in fact co-integrated with the linear combination
[ 8fi log w. + 9 (z-z),]. Assuming that both terms are integrated of
degree one (1(1)), the estimation of the short-run dynamics will involve
only stationary variables. If, in turn, log (w, ) is 1(1) and co-integrated
with log(w,), then - by implication - 0 must be zero, i.e. ?0 = -7...
Then the level term (z-z) does not appear in the co-integration
equation, but the difference term A(z -z) is retained in the specification
of the short-run ^dynamics, i. e.
(11) A log wt
x = /3Q A log wt + rQ A (z
1-z)t - ...
... - (l-aa) [log w^
1 - 9a - 9/3 log wt_a] + et, ;
Economically, this means that regional disequilibria may have a short-run
impact on the regional wage dynamics which is independent of aggregate
disequilibria. However, in the long-run, the regional wage follows the
aggregate wage, no matter how severe and sustained the specifically
regional disequilibrium has been.
Note that the disequilibirum variable (z-z) may be 1(0) or 1(1), i.e.
there may be a stationary difference between the regional and the
national labour market disequilibrium or a difference which changes- 18 -
(11) Rewriting (7) in a different form, we obtain
(12) log w^ = 9Q - 0 A log Wj.
1 + 90 log wt + 9^ (z
X-z)t - ...





with 9 , 9g and 9 defined as above, 0 = a^/il-a.), IIfl = 0-/(1-0-),
II = 7-/(l-a-) and u, = e,/(l-a.). Making the same assumptions on
stationarity and/or the degree of integration as above, equation (12)
involves the identification of all short- and long-run parameters in a
one-step estimation procedure, a result first pointed out by Wickens,
Breusch (1987): the long-run multipliers (9 , 9R, 9 ) are estimated
directly, the short-run coefficients (a0, a-, /30, |31> V_, t-) are
identified by combining the long-run multipliers and the three compound
parameters 0, IL and II . It is important to note that the error term u,
will be correlated with Alog(w, ), which contains a lag-endogenous
variable, so that (10) should not be estimated using ordinary least
squares (OLS), but rather an instrumental variables technique, with
e.g. the lagged right-hand side variables taken as instruments. Hence
the benefit of using a one-step procedure as compared to the two-step
Engle/Granger approach, which is based on OLS, must be weighed
against the cost of losing information in applying instrumental variables
instead of ordinary least squares.
As it turned out in most of our estimates, this very information loss is
in fact serious enough to make a proper identification of the short-run
dynamics virtually impossible - a practical problem which so far seems to
have escaped the attention of the recent econometric literature on
alternative procedures of estimating short- and long-run parameters.
Wickens/Breusch argue that an inadvertent misspecification of the
short-ruri dynamics is most unlikely to harm the estimate of the long-run
multipliers and that, for this very reason, there is no point in deleting
in the . long run. In any case, the long-run effect of
[log w,
1 - 9 - 9R log w] is constrained to zero.
1
6 I.e. log (w^) and log (wt) be 1(1) and (z.-z)t be 1(0) or 1(1).- 19 -
the short-run dynamics in a first step as done by Engle/Granger. As
it stands, this argument is correct since very often, co-integrated
variables are highly non-stationary series so that the estimated long-run
multipliers will hardly be affected by a lower -order correlation of
stationary or close to stationary differences. However, the argument
simply bypasses the price to be paid in terms of the information loss
which is likely to be important precisely for the identification of the
short-run dynamics. After all, the autocorrelation of a variable's
intertemporal changes - be they absolute or log-differences (growth
rates) - is usually much lower than the autocorrelation of the respective
levels so that the standard usage of lagged terms as instruments may
involve a quite dramatic loss of efficiency compared to estimates based on
ordinary least squares.
This is why we shall mostly focus on the empirical results obtained
within the Engle/Granger-framework. As a matter of fact, all estimates of
type (7)-equations were made using both procedures alternatively with a
fairly clear-cut configuration: whereas the long-run multipliers turned
out very similar in the Engle/Granger- and in the
Wickens/Breusch-models, the short-run dynamics could only be
reasonably identified with the two-step procedure.
As to the definitions of the variables, data limitations commanded some
less than perfect choices. The wage is defined as the average wage per
hour of a worker in industry as calculated on a representative cross
section covering 12 per cent of all industrial establishments with at least
ten employees. The wage covers all elements of remuneration which are
paid out regularly, i. e. - roughly speaking - the statutory minimum
wage plus all fringe benefits which can be assigned to the work in the
respective reference period, thus e.g. including overtime or performance
premia, but excluding annual gratifications and social security
contributions.
1
7 See Wickens, Breusch (1987), pp. 35-36- 20 -
For our purposes, this definition has three pecularities which have to be
kept in mind when interpreting the results. First, it is basically a
definition of the effective wage, not the contractual minimum wage as
fixed in collective agreements. Unfortunately, no comparable data are
available on the state level for contractual minimum wages so that no
explicit distinction can be made between interregional wage
flexibility/rig idity as due to corporatist influences and/or to wage
18 drift. However, as wage drift usually adds an element of flexibility on
top of the structure of contractual minimum wages, one may consider any
results based on effective wages as indicating an upper limit of flexibility
or, conversely, a lower limit of rigidity.
Second, our measure of the wage per hour is not an index calculation,
but rather an absolute number (in DM). It is thus not purged of the
wage effects of structural change which come about when workers shift
from lower to higher paid jobs (or vice versa). While this is a drawback,
it should be a tolerable one since our main focus and interest is on
interregional wage rigidity, not on intertemporal wage movements. After
all, it may not be unrealistic to assume that a measurement error of this
kind has little bearing on the interregional structure of industrial wages
as the speed and scope of occupational and sectoral labour mobility is
likely to depend much more on aggregate cyclical than on specifically
regional factors.
Third, as the wage is calculated using a representative cross section of
microcensus data, there is likely to be a spurious correlation between the
national and any regional wage variable due to an overlapping range of
the data base. Given the type of data at our disposal, there is no way
18'
Regional data on contractual minimum wages are only available in a
highly disaggregated form on the level of regional bargaining districts.
For technical reasons - in particular the lack of an appropriate
weighting scheme to calculate industrial and regional averages -, these
data cannot be used for our econometric purposes.
19
Economy-wide industrial statistics do contain wage indices and we
shall discuss estimates with these data further below. By and large,
they confirm the conjecture in the text that the measurement error due
to structural change is likely to be negligible.- 21 -
of avoiding this problem by any adjustment procedures simply because no
information can be made available on the composition of the
representative samples. Naturally, the extent of the problem is likely to
depend on the size of the respective region: small states like the cities
of Berlin (West), Hamburg, and Bremen as well as Schleswig-Holstein,
Rhineland-Palatinate and the Saar may be thought of being .small enough
to figure as a negligible part of the sample; for large states such as
above all Northrhine-Westfalia, Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg, and Lower
Saxony, this is not the case. As it turned out, however, our empirical
20 results did not give any clue as to a bias from this source.
The second core variable of our model is (z -z), which we have called
the specifically regional labour market disequilibrium. The most obvious
choice for this variable is the difference (or log-difference) in the
unemployment rate between region i and the economy as a whole. Of
course, the unemployment rate has its well-known shortcomings as a
proxy for a labour market disequilibrium; this is why we also use
alternative proxies for (z -z) such as the (log-)difference of vacancy
rates and the difference of output (employment) ratios between region i
and the economy as a whole, with the output (employment) ratio defined
as the (log-) deviation of actual (employment) output from a
higher-order-deterministic trend in output. Note that the output
(employment) ratio is a purely cyclical variable measuring the 'gap'
21 between actual and some sort of natural output (employment) level. As
a proxy for a labour market disequilibrium, it catches only cyclical
demand variations in the aggregate or in a region (or, for that matter, a
sector). Note that the output (employment) ratios are by definition trend
stationary; likewise, the difference of any two ratios is stationary so
that one can sensibly use it only in the specification (11) which
constrains the long-run effect of the disequilibrium variable on the
regional wage to zero (G =0). Also, tests for integration are obiviously
redundant for these variables. By and large, the empirical results
20
Appropriate tests using strictly disjunct sets of data will be
presented and discussed below. ,
21
For the concept of the output ratio, see Gorden (1987), pp. 258-259.- 22 -
showed our conclusions to be very robust with respect to the proxy used
so that we shall mostly confine our subsequent discussion to the model
with (z -z) being the difference or the log-difference in the respective
unemployment rates.
Before actually estimating the EG-model as specified in the equations (8)
and (11), we have to scrutinize the univariate time series properties of
the main variables concerned. A set of necessary conditions which must
be met in order to allow for a meaningful estimation may be summarized
as follows:
- for (8): the variables log(w), log(w) and (z-z) are 1(1), the first
differences Alog(w ), Alog(w) and A(z-z) 1(0);
- for (11): the variables log(w ) and log(w) are 1(1) and all first
differences Alog(w
1), Alog(w) and A(z*-z) again 1(0).
Thus the basic (and only) difference between the two specifications as to
the required time series properties is that in (8), (z -z) has to be 1(1)
whereas, in (11), it may be of whatever degree of integration. Hence we
first have to make appropriate tests of integration.
In recent years, there has been a dramatic growth of the literature on
unit root testing procedures, with the bulk of the publications discussing
extensions and modifications of the by now classical Dickey-Fuller test
methodology which focuses on the properties of the t-statistics in
22 autoregressions for any variable x,. Whatever the details of the
23 various tests and their statistical qualities and drawbacks , it has
22
The most important contributions in this tradition are for the basic
model Fuller (1976), and Dickey, Fuller (1979), for appropriate
generalizations Said, Dickey (1984), Phillips (1987), and Phillips,
Perron (1988). Most recently, Schmidt, Phillips (1989) have established
a new strand of unit root tests which look 'directly' at the asymptotic
behavior of a series x, (see also Campbell, Perron (1991), p. 17). In
the following analysis, we shall remain in the realm of the 'traditional'
DF-type models.
23
For a survey evaluation, see Campbell, Perron (1991), pp. 8-27.- 23 -
become more and more evident that, for the applied econometrician, the
outstanding difficulty of all tests is to discriminate between a stochastic
and a deterministic trend component in the data generation process.
Following the seminal work of Nelson, Plosser (1982), who used simple
DF-tests for a wide range of macroeconomic variables, the maintained
hypothesis was that most time series follow a unit root process. However,
more recent theoretical contributions to the debate - notably Blough
(1988), Cochrane (1991) and Campbell, Perron (1991) - have forcefully
argued that there is a near observational equivalence of trend and
difference stationary processes which may seriously impair the power of
the tests if only the deterministic trend is adequately specified, i. e.
possibly including non-linear components. In practice, the simple
experimentation with higher order deterministic trend terms regularly
shows that many time series can be consistently interpreted in two
alternative ways, either as a difference stationary process or as a trend
stationary process with the trend usually being of a higher than first
order. Hence, very much care must be taken in specifying the
deterministic trend to be imposed on the data, in any case much more
care than in the early unit root testing literature following and including
Nelson, Plosser (1982).
Given the paramount importance of deterministic trend specification, we
shall adopt a very broad testing procedure involving five augmented
Dickey-puller (ADF)-tests which differ in the choice of trend
components. The basic ADF-equation for any variable x, is given by
(13) Axt = -(1-/3) xt_1 + t Axtl + et,
with -(1-/3) and t defined as the coefficients to be estimated and e. as a
random error term. If -(1-/3) turns out to be negative at a standard
significance level as given by the appropriate DF-test-tables, then 1(1)
can be rejected; we shall denote the t-ratio of the parameter -(1-0) as
DFQ. Note that - following standard practice - the 'lagged endogenous
variable' Ax, - will be included on purely pragmatic grounds if a first
regression of Ax, on x, 1 gives a residual with a substantial- 24 -
autocorrelation; if not, a simple 'non-augmented' DF-test (with 7=0) is
.24 used.
Equation (13) sets the null hypothesis of 1(1) against stationarity
without any allowance for a deterministic trend component, not even a
drift term or a linear trend. To offer a broad spectrum of alternative
test specifications with other, more general assumptions on the
deterministic trend, we then apply four different variants of a two-step
DF-test, with the first step designed so as to purge the series x, of the
relevant deterministic components. Hence, a regression of the form
n
(14) x. = 2 a.t
1 + y,
1 i=0 *
is run for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, with t defined as a trend variable and y. as
the respective 'detrended' series of x,, i. e. that part of the variation
of x, which cannot be accounted for by deterministic elements. Thus,
step by step, higher-order deterministic trends are introduced, namely a
2 constant (aQ), a linear (aA), a quadratic (cut ) and a cubic trend term
(aA. ). With the detrended variable y., the ADF-test regression
(15) Ayt = -(1-/3') ytl + r' Ay^ + e t'
is run, with -(1-/3') and r' as the coefficients to be estimated and e '
the respective random error term. The t-ratio of -(1-/3
1) gives the
appropriate DF-statistics, which we call DF.., DF2, DF^ and DF.
respectively. In tests for integration of degree two, exactly the same
procedures are used to calculate DF_ down to DF., with the only
25 difference being that x, is replaced by Ax. in equations (13) and (14).
24
For a survey on the question of augmentation, which is more
important for data with seasonal components, see Campbell, Perron
(1991), pp. 14-16.
25
Note that, only for DF.. and DF?, the two-step procedure as
described in the text is asymptotically equivalent to the one-step
procedure with the trend variable simply included in the regression of- 25 -
Our testing design gives a broad menue of analogously constructed test
statistics for different deterministic trend constellations. It thus allows to
detect the breaking point of deterministic complexity - if there is one -
at which a non-stationary series can be described as being stationary
around some possibly rather complex long-term trend. This is very
helpful for two rather pragmatic reasons. First, a casual glance over the
relevant time series - for that matter, over virtually all macroeconomic
time series for the post-World War II period - indicates that, if at all, a
second- or third-order deterministic trend - and not a linear one - could
be made responsible for the observed non-stationarity. To stop the
testing at a linear trend may thus simply bypass an important prima facie
characteristic of the series. Second, as the integration test is no more
than the preliminary stage for subsequently estimating co-integration
equations, it is important to know whether the relevant two series can be
described not only as difference stationary, but also as trend-stationary
with the same order of the trend terms. If this is the case, then the
co-integration equation can be interpreted as a test for deterministic
co-integration - meaning that the same vector of parameters, which
describes the unit root, also eliminates the deterministic trend from the
data. Note that deterministic integration is an unambiguously stronger
demand than mere 'stochastic' integration, the latter meaning that the
relevant parameter vector removes the unit root, but not the
deterministic trend, which has to be eliminated before running the
co-integration regression. Statistically, deterministic co-integration is,
of course, a very convenient property since it spares the effort of
filtering out deterministic components, which, in all likelihood, are close
to observationally equivalent to a unit root process. Economically,
deterministic co-integration has the advantage of greatly facilitating the
interpretation of co-integration as a long-run equilibrium: whatever the
data generation process of the relevant time series may be - a unit root
type (13); for DF_ and DF., which concern higher order than linear
trends, the two-step ana the one-step procedure may not be
equivalent, even not asymptotically, with the standard properties of
the tests applying only in the two-step version. See Campbell, Perron
(1991), pp. 8-12.
*
For the details of the two concepts, see Campbell, Perron (1991),
p. 25.- 26 -
or a complex deterministic trend -, the series can be taken to have an
unambiguous long-run equilibrium relationship.
It is important to realize that our testing methodology as described above
reflects a rather pragmatic philosophy which considers the DF-test
battery more as a set of tools to skan the data for the characteristics of
their generation process, not to obtain a clear-cut answer from some
nicely tabulated test statistics on how the data generation process is
likely to be. As experience shows, all standard tests loose much of their
power if higher-order deterministic trends are allowed for. Hence, one
should simply not expect anything like a straight and unmistakable
answer from them, at least not in the world of the sample sizes we have
at hand in economic research. Nevertheless, the skanning of the data for
trend components and unit root processes is extremely important so as to
lay the ground for the subsequent procedures to be applied, notably in
multivariate co-integration analysis.
In our view, the data skanning can reasonably be made with many
different test types, be they of the Dickey-Fuller or, e.g. of the
27 Schmidt-Phillips variety. Given the uniformly low power of these tests
when putting difference against highei—order trend stationarity, the
choice of the test family becomes a marginal issue compared to the
appropriate specification of the deterministic trend. After all, the low
test power is the consequence of the near observational equivalence of
the alternative hypotheses and the low informational content of the data;
the first is a theoretical problem beyond the reach of statistical medicine,
the second could be cured if richer data were available. Note that 'richer
data' does of course not simply mean more data: e.g., if the relevant
long-term for integration and co-integration tests is to be defined in
decades, then a mere increase of the data frequency by switching from
annual to quarterly or monthly data, if available, cannot really help,
because the high frequency range is likely to have very little marginal
information on long-run univariate movements or multivariate
relationships. To the contrary, the test power is usually lower for data
2
7 See Schmidt, Phillips (1989).- 27 -
of frequencies shorter than a year as seasonal adjustment procedures
28 must be applied and often lead to less precise and biased estimates.
4. 2. Estimation Results
Let us first discuss the main results of our integration tests. Table 1
presents the five test statistics DF_, DF-, DFO, DF~, and DF. for the
variables log(w ), log(u/u), and (u-u), both for first- and for
second-order integration. As the period covered is 1950-89, the Saar and
Berlin remain exluded since not all of the relevant data are available for
these two states in the first decade of the sample period. The DF-tests
were made in the augmented form involving one lag-endogenous term for
first-order tests and in the non-augmented form (7=0) for the
29 second-order tests. Note that critical values at the standard
significance levels are only available for the statistics DF.-., DF1, and
30 DF™, but not for DF_ and DF.. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the
statistics DF^ and DF. relative to DF-, DF.., and DF~ gives us a clear
indication of whether the additional trend terms are of much help to
track the long-run movement of the time series. This is in line with our
pragmatic philosophy on testing sketched above.
The picture conveyed by the numbers in Table 1 is informative though
as usual not conclusive. As to the wage variable (log(w ) and log(w)),
the 'low-order' DF-statistics (DF,,, DF.., DF~) uniformly indicate that
integration of degree one (1(1)) cannot be rejected at any of the
standard significance levels (1 to 10 per cent). However, the picture
changes when higher-order trend terms are added. In particular, the
inclusion of a cubic trend term leads to a dramatic increase of the
28
On this issue, see Shiller, Perron (1985), Ghysels, Perron (1990),
Jaeger, Kunst (1990), and the survey in Campbell, Perron (1991),
pp. 13-14.
29
The basic pattern of the results is hardly affected by the pragmatic
decisions on restricting or not the parameter r in the equations (13)
and (15). The choice of augmentation or non-augmentation is made on
the basis of the autocorrelation in the error term of the non-augmented
test version.
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Notes: Test statistics DFQ, DF,, DF,, DF, and DF. as defined in the text, with (non-augmented) Dickey-
Fuller test ( f,f = 0 In equations (13) and (15)) for first-order tests and augmented Dickey-
Fuller test (unrestricted y-.y' in equations (13) and (15)) for second-order tests. Critical
values for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5 %- (10 %-) level are about -1.95
(-1.61) for DFQ, -2.93 (-2.60) for DF., and -3.50 (-3.18) for DF (see Fuller 1976, p. 373, Table
8.5.2, for n=5o). For DF, and DF^ no such critical values are available, but it is certain that
they will be higher in absolute terms than the ones for DF..- 29 -
DF-statistic, , with DF. being well above four in absolute terms in eight
out of nine cases. The corresponding autoregressive parameter /3 (not
printed in the table!) turned out to be lower than 0.5 in most cases. For
our prospective co-integration analysis, it is further important to realize
that the structure of the test statistics is very similar for all logCw
1) and
for log(w) which can all be taken either to follow a unit root-process or
to be stationary around a third-order deterministic trend. Hence, a
subsequent co-integration estimate can be quite safely interpreted as a
test for the stronger form of deterministic, not just the weaker form of
stochastic integration.
As to second-order integration of the wage variables (in logs), the
DF-statistics speak a fairly unambiguous language: all of them point
against 1(2), as far as they go at extremely high significance levels, and
higher-order deterministic trends beyond a constant and a linear trend
do hardly matter. Again, the pattern of DF-statistics between states and
for West Germany as a whole is fairly uniform so that, again, the same
data generation process can be assumed to drive the wage in all regional
parts of the country.
As to the two variables for the regional labour market disequlibrium
(log(u/u), u-u), there is no doubt that 1(2) cannot be accepted since,
in the vast majority of cases, the DF-statistics turn out to be very high
in absolute terms, and if measurable, highly significant. Also, the
detrending does not affect the results to any substantial degree which
points to the absence of strong linear or non-linear trend elements. On
the other hand, the results for the 1(1)-tests differ markedly between
states, between the disequilibrium variables used and between the type
of detrending performed, with no easy generalizations possible. In some
states like Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg and Rhineland-Palatinate, the
test statistics point more towards stationarity although - even for them -
the results are not altogether clear-cut. For other states like Bremen,
Baden-Wurttemberg and Bavaria, the weight of the testing evidence pulls
towards a unit root. For some of the states like Schleswig-Holstein and
Rhineland-Palatinate, it also strongly depends on the variable used. All
in all, it seems that both assumptions (1(0) and 1(1)) can be defended
on statistical grounds at least for a subset of states. Hence, in view of
w
1) and log(w) being 1(1), none of the specifications (8) and (11)- 30 -
can be excluded a priori on basis of univariate time series characteristics
of the data so that we may start our empirical exercise with either of
them. For reasons of convenience, we shall first pick the more
restrictive version (11) so as to find out whether the aggregate wage
level 'alone' delivers a satisfactory account of the regional wage levels in
the long run, i.e. whether log (w ) and log (w) are co-integrated.
Let us now turn to the results of our estimates of the co-integration
equation. To begin with, Table 2 presents the coefficients of a two-step
Eng le /Granger -model of the type (11), i.e. co-integration is tested just
between the regional and the aggregate wage without consideration for
specifically regional labour market disequilibria in "the long run. All
across the nine states of the sample, the estimates of Table 2 have some
characteristic features which we shall briefly summarize and discuss in
the following paragraphs.
(i) As to the statistical efficiency of the long-run estimates, the two
coefficients 9 and 9R appear to be very well identified in all equations
of the first step of the EG-procedure: the lowest R is still as high as
0.9992, the standard estimation errors are extremely low and the t-ratios
of 8R fall in the range 200-500 which is large by any reasonable
standard.
(ii) As to the magnitude of the long-run coefficients, a clear-cut pattern
can be recognized. For all states, 0R is rather close to unity; in most
cases, however, it remains significantly different from one since the very
low standard estimation errors make the confidence intervals extremely
small and thus allow to reject the null hypothesis that 9R exactly equals
unity. In all equations, 9Q falls within the interval [0.98; 1.03], which
is narrow indeed; it means, e.g., that a 10 %-wage increase in West
Germany as a whole would be accompanied by a 9.8 %-increase in the
'lower limit'-state Northrhine-Westfalia and a 10.3 %-increase in the
'upper limit'-state Rhineland-Palatinate, with all other states falling in
between. To put it in historical terms: if the two 'limit'-states had
started in 1950 at the economy-wide average wage of 1. 22 DM per hour
(which they have not!) and if the West German economy had experienced
its actual average wage growth of 7.24 % p. a. - leading to an average












































































































































































































































3 = adjusted R
3; SE = standard estimation error; DW = Durbin-Watson-statistic; DF = Dickey-Fuller-statistic for first-order
autoregression of residuals; £ = estimated coefficient of first-order autoregression of residuals; v . = lagged error term from
first step of EG-model. Table based on. estimates of equation (11); first step specified by equation (9) with 8r = 0, second step
by equation (10). Standard estimation errors of coefficients in parenthesis. For DW, the critical value for rejecting the null
hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about 0.755 (range of indifference from 0.484 to 0.755); see
Sargan, Bhargava (1983), p. 157, Table I for T=51 and n=l. For DF, critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit
root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about -3.365, at the 10 %-level about -3.066 and at the 15 %-level about -2.864; see
Phillips, Ouliaris (1990), p. 190, Table II for n=l.- 32 -
ended up at a wage of 18.33 DM per hour, the 'upper-limit'-state at
19.12 DM per hour, a less than 1 DM-difference after 39 years!
The long-run constant 0 varies depending on whether, roughly
speaking, the respective state started as a high-wage or a low-wage
region. E.g., the northern states Northrhine-Westfalia, Hamburg, and to
a lesser extent Bremen had traditionally high industrial wages while the
southern states Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Wiirttemberg and especially
Bavaria lagged behind. Remarkably enough, it is the originally low-wage
states of Southern Germany which experienced the most rapid trend
growth of wages and thus somewhat caught up to the northern industrial
centers. Up to the present, this catching-up process has transformed
Baden-Wurttemberg, but not yet Bavaria and Rhineland- Palatinate into
high-wage regions: e.g., by 1989, the original 15 %-wage lead of
Northrhine-Westfalia over Rhineland-Palatinate has been narrowed (but
not removed!) to 3.5%; in turn, the lag of Bavaria behind
Northrhine-Westfalia has shrunk from about 20 % in 1950 to less than 7 %
31 by 1989, but still it is a lag. At this point, it is important to
remember that, within the confines of our model, these catching-up
processes have nothing to do with labour market disequilibria in the
respective regions; rather they reflect changing industrial structures
between regions and/or changes in the long-term wage positions of those
industries which are disproportionally represented in the particular
region in question. If, e.g., the wage lead of Northrhine-Westfalia has
been gradually eroded, this means that the workers in typically
capital-intensive industries which are concentrated in the
Rhine/Ruhr-valley, have experienced a long-run terms-of-trade loss
vis-a-vis workers in other industries which dominate in other regions.
There are many plausible reasons for such long-term shifts as, e.g., a
changing interindustrial pattern of qualification, of age composition, of
the share of male and female workers etc. ; per se, however, such shifts
are independent of the extent of regional labour market disequilibria, be
31
Note that these numbers have been calculated on basis of ex-post
predictions of regional wages given the long-run coefficients presented
in Table 2. However, if calculated on basis of actual wages, the
numbers are not much different.- 33 -
they temporary or permanent. In any case/they are not the focal point
of our empirical analysis.
(iii) In testing for co-integration, we use two test-statistics, namely DW
- the Durbin-Watson statistic following the rationale of the so-called
Sargan-Bhargava-test - and DF, the conventional Dickey-Fuller
statistic calculated by imposing a pure first-order autocorrelation process
(without drift or trend terms) on the residuals of the co-integration
34 equation. Note that the critical values for both statistics if used in
tests for co-integration must be based on the case of a random walk with
drift, i. e. an autoregressive process involving a constant, because the
35
co-integration equation itself does have a constant term (0 ). This, in
turn, is the reason why the power of the Sargan-Bhargava-test suffers
from a wide margin of inconclusiveness where the decision on accepting
or rejecting the unit root process cannot be made at any of the standard
confidence levels; e.g., in the case of 51 observations and a
5 %-confidence level, the 'interval of indifference' for the DW-statistic is
!
[0.484; 0.755], in practice quite a large range as will become clear
below. Therefore we shall mostly focus on the message of the
DF-statistic.
In glancing over the actual co-integration test results of Table 2, the
picture is ambiguous: the DW- and DF-statistics point to a considerable
degree of autocorrelation of the residuals in the first step of the
EG-procedure, but whether the null hypothesis of a unit root should be
rejected at standard significance levels is unclear. The DW-statistic
32
As a matter of fact, they would have to be explained in a completely
different conceptual framework aimed at exploring the determinants of
the long-run wage structure. See, e.g., Dickens, Katz (1987a, b),
Gibbons, Katz (1989), Katz, Summers (1989), Krueger, Summers
(1988), Thaler (1989), and Gundlach, Fels (1990).
See Sargan, Bhargava (1983).
34
Unlike in tests for integration, it makes no sense to include
deterministic elements in the DF-test simply because, by construction,
an error term of an ordinary least squares estimate has a zero mean.
The relevant critical values for an infinite sample size are tabulated
in Phillips, Ouliaris (1990), pp. 189-190.- 34 -
indicates as much as four cases of indifference, and the Dp-statistic
rejects the null hypothesis in five out of nine equations at the 5 %-level
and is very close to rejection in a sixth case. Note also that the
autoregressive parameter p is far below one in most of the estimates
underlying the DF-statistics - in seven out of nine cases below 0.7;
nevertheless, standard errors in the range of 0. 10-0. 15 do often not
allow to reject the unit root-hypothesis at the conventional levels of
significance. As usual, it seems to be virtually impossible to discriminate
between a stationary process with autoregressive parameter close to but
36 below one, and a random walk.
In view of the extremely tight statistical relationship between log(w
J) and
log(w) as measured by R , however, it would look somewhat farfetched
to decide against co-integration only because the null hypothesis of a
unit root cannot be rejected at the usual significance levels; after all,
these very significance levels are quite demanding for the particular test
37 purpose at hand. As Hendry (1986) has pointed out, the likelihood of
a type 11-error - falsely accepting a wrong null hypothesis - may become
very high if the alternative hypothesis of stationarity includes cases with
autoregressive parameters of close to one. Given the rather strong a
priori belief in the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship
between the wage in region i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and the country as a
whole, the price to be paid for any such type II-error would also be
very high; it would mean rejecting co-integration despite strong priors
_ 2
in its favour and a very high R . A careful specification of an
appropriate loss function (of course, going way beyond the scope of our
analysis) would certainly give due weight to the priors and thus call for
less demanding significance levels.
Looking over the test statistics DW and DF with these second thoughts in
mind, the general conclusion should be that a substantial autocorrelation
36
This, again, is a conseqence of the near observational equivalence of
a unit root process and a stationary or trend-stationary process. See
Blough (1988), Cochrane (1991), and Campbell, Perron (1991),
pp. 18-23.
3
7 See Hendry (1986), p. 206.- 35 -
in residuals is discernible, but that it does not quite point towards a
unit root. This conjecture derives some support from the results of the
second step of the EG-procedure which yields an autoregressive
parameter a- below 0.7 in seven out of nine cases - thus indicating that
the short-run dynamics does not involve anything close to a unit root
process. Again, however, the respective standard errors - they are in
the range of 0. 10-0. 15 - do not quite allow to reject the unit
root-hypothesis at the all too demanding conventional levels of
significance.
(iv) The very high R all across the co-integration equations of Table 2
raises the question of how much 'autonomous' variation of the regional
wage is really left for the short-run dynamics to be explained in the
second EG-step. In a log-linear specification, the standard error is also
a good measure of the 'standard percentage gap' between the actual and
the fitted values so that it can serve as a proxy for the 'leeway' which
is left for the second step. As the standard errors given in Table 2
show, this leeway is quite small all throughout, generally in the range of
1-2.5 %. Thus, before proceeding any further, it is important to keep in
mind that the 'explanatory scope' left for any specifically regional factors
is quite small .since more than 97 % of all variation of regional wages can
be accounted for by the movement of the aggregate wage. Hence,
whatever measure of regional wage flexibility we shall obtain, it will
describe no more than a marginal phenomena.
(v) The short-run dynamics in Table 2 is a bit more differentiated
across states than the long-run relationship although some important
common features can again be recognized. First, all coefficients Z3- come
close to one at very low standard estimation errors; they all fall in the
narrow interval [0.97; 1.03] with none of them being different from
unity at standard significance levels. Hence it is quite safe to conclude
that any regional wage and the aggregate wage share not only a common
stochastic or deterministic trend, but also a common short-run dynamics.
Second, all coefficients of the variable Alog(u-u) which serves as a
proxy for the rate of change in the specifically regional labour market
disequilibrium, turned out to be not different from zero at the
conventional significance levels, although - in seven out of nine cases -
they have the expected negative sign. Third, the autoregressive- 36 -
parameter a., of the lagged error term from the co-integration equation
varies considerably across states, just as the co-integration test
statistics DW and DF vary in the first step of the EG-procedure.
However, a., falls in the central range 0.3-0.7 in seven out of nine cases
at standard errors around 0. 10-0. 15 - thus in general pointing towards a
38 strongly lagged adjustment, but not a unit root process. Finally, the
statistical quality of the short-run estimates is quite satisfactory, except
perhaps for the equation of Schleswig-Holstein, which has a much lower
explanatory power than all other estimates; in general, the R is well
above 0.8 and the DW-statistic does not indicate any substantial
39 autocorrelation in the residuals.
(vi) As the parametric shape of the short-run dynamics might be very
sensitive with respect to the disequilibrium variable used, we also
carried out the second step of the EG-procedure using three alternative
proxies for A(z -z) in equation (11), namely the change of the absolute
difference of the regional and the aggregate unemployment rate
i 40
(A(u-u)), the change of the difference of the output (employment)
ratio between region i and the economy as a whole A(OR -OR), A(ER -ER)
respectively), with the ouput (employment) ratio again defined as the
log-deviation of the actual output (employment) from a higher-order
deterministic trend. Remember that the output and the employment ratios
need not be tested for their degree of integration since, by definition,
they are constrained to be trend stationary. Table 2 presents just the
coefficient rn of these variables in the relevant regressions; the
concommittant parameters J3« and (1-a..) did hardly differ from previous
38
In general, a1 comes very close in magnitude to the autoregressive
parameter p underlying the DF-statistics in the first step of the
EG-estimate.
39
As the DW-statistic is biased in the presence of lag-endogenous
variables, alternative autocorrelation statistics like the
Durbin-t-statistic were also applied. They did not indicate any residual
autocorrelation either.
40
Note that, in an alternative set of specifications, we also replaced
the unemployment rate by the vacancy rate as a proxy for the labour
market .disequilibrium, both in the specifications with Alog(u-u)
and A(u-u). As a matter of fact, none of our conclusions in the text
was substantially affected by this change.- 37 -
estimates so we simply left them out of the table. Qualitatively, the
results confirm our prior conjectures: for ACu^u), /30 has the expected
negative sign in six out of nine equations, but only in one of them, the
one for Hesse, it is also significantly different from zero at the
5 %-level. The record of A(OR*-OR) and AtER^ER) as proxies is equally
poor: in the case of A (OR -OR), 0Q has the expected positive sign only
in four out of nine equations, with significance at the 5 %-level being
achieved only in two (Rhineland-Palatinate and, again, Hesse); in the
case of A(ER-ER), there is seven times the expected positive sign, but
in just one case (Northrhine-Westfalia) at the 5 % significance level.
To gain a rough quantitative impression of the magnitude of the
short-run wage effects initiated by specifically regional labour market
disequilibria, let us assume that u = u .. =u1
1 and u
1 = 2u .A i.e.,
from an initial state of equal regional and aggregate unemployment rates
- say 1 or 4 % -, the regional rate doubles. Table 3 summarizes the
one-period impulse effect of this exogenous shock on the regional wage
for all nine states, given the parametric shape of the EG-estimates in
Table 2. Note that, due to the restriction rn = -r- which is imposed in
equation (11), the impulse effect in the first period is also the maximum
effect to be reached at all since, from the second period on, it gradually
dissipates with the speed of the decay depending on the magnitude of
the autoregressive parameter a-.
As can be seen from the numbers in the table, the impulse effects are
small by any standard, if at all 'correctly' signed: in the log-linear
framework, a doubling of the unemployment rate differential leads to a
temporary dampening of regional wage growth by more than 1 % in just
three states, by more than 2 % in just one state (Hesse), on average by
just 0. 43 %. The semi-log model implies a somewhat greater wage effect in
higher unemployment ranges - on average a dampening by 2. 14 % at a
5 % aggregate unemployment rate -, but that should not affect the main
thrust of our conclusions; after all, a doubling of the unemployment rate
differential under these circumstances would be an altogether spectacular
exogenous shock, which is way off the magnitude of any actual event for
the relevant states in the sample period. In this sense, even a
12 %-regional wage effect as the one indicated by the estimates for Hesse
may still look quite modest, not to mention the 4-4. 5 %-effect for- 38 -
Table 3 - Impulse Effect on the Regional Wage (in %) of a Doubling in
the Regional Labour Market Disequilibrium














































Notes: Impulse effects calculated on basis of the respective estimates in
Table 2.
Northrhine-Westfalia and Bavaria and the less than 2 %-effeet for Lower
Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Wiirttemberg. On the whole, the
picture of the short-run wage dynamics is clearly one of a high degree
of rigidity with respect to regional labour market disequilibria.
To test for intertemporal stability of the parameters in Table 2 and to
include the two additional states Berlin and the Saar, we reestimated
equation (11) and the respective test statistics for the shorter period
1960-89. The results of the integration tests are summarized in Table 4.
By and large, they support our prior conjectures as to the degree of
integration of the three variables concerned: log(w
1) and log(w) are
either difference stationary (1(1)) or trend stationary around a higher
order (notably a cubic) deterministic trend; log(uVu) is either 1(0) or
1(1), again depending on the complexity of the deterministic trend, in
any case not 1(2). Only the time path of (u*-u) looks slightly different
from Table 2 where it appeared to be 1(0) or 1(1); in Table 3, the test
statistics point much more towards 1(1), even if higher order





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Test statistics DFQ, DF., DF,, DF, and DF. as defined in the text, with (non-augmented) Dickey-
Fuller test ( <r,f = 0 in equations (13) and (15)) for first-order tests and augmented
Dickey-Fuller test (unrestricted y, y-
1 in equations (13) and (15)) for second-order tests.
Critical values for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5 %- (10 %-) level are
about -1.95 (-1.60) for DFQ, -3.00 (-2.63) for DF,, and -3.60 (-3.24) for DF, (see Fuller 1976, p.
373, Table 8.5.2, for n=25). For DF, and DF. no such critical values are available, but it is
certain that they will be higher in absolute terms than the ones for DF..- 40 -
The results of the Engle/Granger-estimates for 1960-89 are shown in
Table 5: for that subset of states which was also included in the larger
sample, the results have the same characteristics as in Table 2 - thus
indicating that no dramatic structural change need to be assumed
between the decade of the 'German economic miracle' and later years.
Note, in particular, that the standard error of the long-run estimates is
again very small, on average even somewhat smaller than for the larger
sample period. Hence our conclusion concerning the magnitude of regional
wage differentiation receives additional support.
As to co-integration, the message of the two statistics DW and DF is
again not conclusive. Most DW-statistics are higher in Table 5 than in
Table 2, but so are the critical values at a larger range of indifference
stretching from 0.747 to 1. 156. The DF-statistics point towards rejecting
the null hypothesis (i.e. a unit root in the residuals) in five out of
eleven cases, if conventional significance levels (1 to 10 %) are applied,
but another three states' estimates have DF-values at above 2.25 iri
absolute terms which would indicate significance at about the
20-30 %-level. The autoregression parameter p falls well below 0.8 in all
estimates except the one for Berlin which is different in that it is the
only state where the data speak somewhat conclusively in favour of a
unit root and thus against co-integration (DW = 0.135, DF = 0.900): as
Berlin is the only one out of the eleven West German states which has
been geographically isolated over the sample period and which may thus
have developed more of an 'autonomous' labour market, this result seems
to have some economic significance. We shall return to this matter below.
As to the short-run dynamics, /3~ is again very close to one; the
coefficient of the specifically regional labour market variable (?n) turns
out 'correctly' signed in nine out of eleven cases, but in eight of them
not significantly different from zero at the 5 %-level. Note that the only
case in Table 2 of a r. close to significance (Hesse) does not stand out
any more when the sample is restricted to the time after the 1950s. As to
the alternative specifications involving the absolute difference of
unemployment rates (A(u-u)) or the difference in output (employment)
ratios (A(OR
X-OR), A(ER
1-ER)), the diffuse picture of Table 2 is
basically repeated with significant and 'correctly' signed parameters only






























































































































































































































































































J = adjusted R
a; SE = standard estimation error; DW = Durbin-Watson-statistic; DF = Dickey-Fuller-statistic for first-order
autoregression of residuals; £ = estimated coefficient of first-order autoregression of residuals; v. = lagged error term from
first step of EG-model. Table based on estimates of equation (11); first step specified by equation ~(9) with Sp = 0, second step
by equation (10). Standard estimation errors of coefficients in parenthesis. For DW, the critical value for rejecting the null
hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about 1.156 (range of indifference from 0.747 to 1.156). See
Sargan, Bhargava (1983), p. 157, Table I for T=31 and n=l. For DF, critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit
root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about -3.365, at the 10 %-level about -3.066 and at the 15 %-level about -2.864; see
Phillips, Ouliaris (1990), p. 190, Table II for n=l.- 42 -
What makes the results of Table 5 interesting in their own right are the
cases of the two additional (small) states Berlin and the Saar. Both
states seem to stand out in that their estimates' standard errors are
relatively large. Yet looking over all state results in Table 5, it becomes
evident that all 'small' states, say, those with a population of less than
2.5 million (i.e. Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, the Saar, and
Berlin), have rather high estimation errors and most of them also rather
low DW- and DF-statistics (in absolute terms). In fact, this makes one
suspicious whether the explanatory power of the estimates and the
co-integration properties may not be to some extent a mere reflection of
the microcensus methodology used to calculate the wage data which, as
41 described above, may lead to an endogeneity bias depending on the
size of the state. To make a rough-and-ready check whether such a bias
ought to be a cause for concern, we carried out the EG-procedure for all
possible combinations of the state data in the period 1960-89, without any
recourse to the data for West Germany as a whole. Technically, this
means that, in equation (11), the aggregate variables were step-by-step
replaced by the respective variables for all other states except the one
whose wage was to be explained. Table 6 presents the matrix of the
standard estimation errors and the respective DW-statistics for all the
110 cross state estimates which cannot be affected by any endogeneity
bias since they are based on disjunct samples of data. Comparing the
(unweighted) averages of the 10 standard estimation errors and the
respective DW-statistics of any state i, the familiar interstate pattern
emerges, with the four small states having relatively high estimation
errors and low DW. The same pattern can be discerned for any of the
rows and columns of the matrix. All this gives one a fair amount of
confidence that the endogeneity bias, if present at all, does not play a
significant or even decisive role both with respect to the explanatory
power of the estimates and to their co-integration properties.
Up to this point, we strictly stayed within the framework of the model as
set out by equation (11), with the long-run effect of a regional labour
market disequilibrium on the regional wage level assumed to be zero
41
See Part 3 above.Table 6 - Standard Estimation Error and Durbin-Watson Statistic for 110 Cross State Estimates 1960-1989 (Engle/Granger-Model, First Step)



























































































































































































































































































































Notes: SH = Schleswig-Hostein; HA = Hamburg; LS = Lower Saxony; BM = Bremen; NW = Northrhine-Westfalia; HS = Hesse; RP = Rhineland-Palatinate; SA = Saar;
BV = Baden-Wurttemberg; BV = Bavaria; BL = Berlin; FRG = Federal Republic of Germany. Estimates corresponding to equation (9) with 9r = 0.- 44 -
(6 =0). As the tests for integration and co-integration have shown, the
data are by and large compatible with this model, although some
ambiguities remain. In particular, it is difficult to decide on basis of the
test statistics (i) whether the proxies for the labour market
disequilibrium (z -z) are integrated of degree one or stationary, and
(ii) whether the wage level in any region i is co-integrated with the
aggregate wage level or not. In the spirit of equation (11), we left
question (i) open and assumed question (ii) to be answered in favour of
co-integration. If we instead take question (i) to be answered in favour
of integration of degree one and question (ii) against co-integration
- both assumptions again not incompatible with the test statistics -, we
can estimate equation (8) as a test for co-integration of the regional
wage with a linear combination of the aggregate wage and the regional
labour market disequilibrium. Note that the move from (11) to (8)
concerns only the long run, i. e. 9 is not constrained to zero anymore;
the specification of the short-run dynamics remains unchanged, and so
do the assumptions with respect to the time series properties of the
differenced variables (Alog(w ), Alog(w) and A(z -z)') which are all taken
to be stationary, a realistic assumption as the second-order tests for
integration have confirmed.
The Tables 7 and 8 present our estimates of the EG-model as specified
by equation (8) for the periods 1950-89 and 1960-89 respectively; the
format of the tables is analogous to that of the corresponding Tables 2
42 and 5. Focusing on the differences between the results of the
respective equations (11) and (8), five points are worth noting:
(i) As to the 'explanatory power' of the additional variable log(u/u) in
the first step of the EG-procedure, the picture is mixed. For the period
1950-89, the long-run coefficient 9 has the expected negative sign in
five out of nine cases, but only in two of them, it is also significant at
the 5 %-level (Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria); for the shorter period
42
The only major difference between the two sets of tables is that
equation (8) has not been estimated with the difference in output
(employment) ratios as a proxy for labour market disequilibrium, since














































































































































































































































2 = adjusted R
2; SE = standard estimation error; DW = Durbin-Watson-statistic; DF = Dickey-Fuller-statistic for first-order
autocorrelation of residuals; ^ = estimated coefficient of first-order autoregression; v, = lagged error term from first step
of EG-model. Table based on estimates of equation (11): first step specified by equation (9), second step by equation (10).
Standard estimation errors of coefficients in parenthesis. For DW, the critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit
root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about 1.172 (range of indifference from 0.465 to 1.172); see Sargan, Bhargava (1983),
p. 157, Table I for T=51 and n=3. For DF, critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at
the 5 %-level about -3.768, at the 10 %-level about -3.449 and at the 15 %-level about -3.265; see Phillips, Ouliaris (1990),



























































































































































































































































































2 = adjusted R*; SE = standard estimation error; DW = Durbin-Watson-statistic; DF = Dickey-Fuller-statistic for first-order
autocorrelation of residuals; £ = estimated coefficient of first-order autoregression; v . = lagged error term from first step
of EG-model. Table based on estimates of equation (11): first step specified by equation (9), second step by equation (10).
Standard estimation errors of coefficients in parenthesis. For DW, the critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit
root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about 1.736 (range of indifference from 0.699 to 1.736); see Sargan, Bhargava (1983),
p. 157, Table I for T=31 and n=3. For DF, critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at
the 5 %-level about -3.768, at the 10 %-level about -3.449 and at the 15 %-level about -3.265; see Phillips, Ouliaris (1990),
p. 190, Table II b for n=2.- 47 -
1960-89, a negative sign appears in five out of eleven cases, with four
of the corresponding coefficients being significant at the 5 %-level
(Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, the Saar, Berlin).
(ii) All in all, the explanatory power of the long-run estimates as
measured by R and SE seems to be slightly better than in the
respective equations of the Tables 2 and 5. Note, however, that in those
cases wherer 8 has a 'perverse' sign and a t-ratio greater than one in
absolute terms - three cases for 1950-89 and as many as six for
1960-89 -, the improvement owes much to the power of a variable which,
on a priori grounds, should better be left out altogether. Qualitatively
the same applies to the co-integration statistics: although most of them
are better than in the corresponding equations of Tables 2 and 5, the
improvement at least partly reflects the power of a variable with an
43
implausibly signed coefficient.
(iii) In the Tables 7 and 8, the most remarkable long-term estimates
appear to be those for the four small states Berlin, Hamburg, the Saar,
and Schleswig-Holstein in the shorter sample period 1960-89. In these
cases, allowing for a non-zero long-term multiplier 0 leads to quite
dramatic improvements in explanatory power and in co-integration
properties as well as to the 'expected' negative sign of 0 . The case of
Berlin is particularly striking: whereas its DF- and DW-statistics in
Table 5 clearly speak against co-integration, they do not any more in
Table 8 - thus indicating that the labour market in the geographically
isolated territorium of West Berlin is in fact likely to have had its own
long-run wage dynamics, which was not unaffected by regional
disequilibria.
(iv) Qualitatively similar results for the long-run multipliers are obtained
when (z
X-z) is proxied by (u*-u) instead of log(u /u). For 1950-89, 0
43
In addition, the critical values for rejecting a unit root in the
residuals are higher (in absolute terms) than in the respective
equations of Tables 2 and 5 since more than one variable is included
on the right-hand side of the co-integration equation.- 48 -
turns out negative at the 5 %-significance level in four out of nine, for
1960-89 in just three out of eleven cases.
(v) As could be expected, the short-run dynamics estimated in the
second step of the EG-procedure looks fairly invariant to whether the
long-run multiplier 9 is restricted to zero or not. As in the Tables 2
and 5, the coefficient r_ turns out mostly insignificant and often
'wrongly' signed. Also, most other statistical characteristics of the
relevant equations remain basically unchanged.
Again, we shall try to obtain a rough quantitative impression of the
magnitude of the wage effects implied by our estimates. Following the
methodology underlying Table 3, we assume that u = u_- = u * and
u = 2u_1 , i. e. from an initial state of equal regional and aggregate
unemployment rates - say 1 or 4 % -, the regional rate doubles. Table 9
presents the long-run effect of this exogenous shock on the regional
wage for all states in the sample period 1950-89 and 1960-89, both for
the two alternative specifications with log(u/u) and (u-u) as the
relevant disequilibrium variable.
By and large, the results confirm our prior conjecture that the
interregional structure of wages is fairly rigid in the long run; only in
very few cases - Schleswig-Holstein for both samples, Bavaria for
1950-89 as well as Hamburg, the Saar and Berlin for 1960-89 - do the
effects surpass 4 %; in all cases, they remain well below 10 %, if at all
'correctly' signed. The picture does not look very different for the
semilog-linear specification: if the original aggregate and regional
unemployment rates are 1 %, the doubling of the regional rate reduces
the regional wage by less than 2 % in most cases, with Schleswig-Holstein
and Berlin being the minor exceptions for the sample 1960-89. At a much
higher unemployment rate of 5 % to start with, the effect becomes larger,
but - again except for Schleswig-Holstein and Berlin - remains below the
10 %-level. On average, the long-run wage effect is just 1.6 96, a small
number by any reasonable standard.
So much for the econometric evaluation of interregional wage rigidity with
respect to regional labour market disequilibria. Despite some inherent

































































































Notes: Long-run effects calculated on basis of the respective estimates in Tables 7 and 8.- 50 -
the empirical picture, it is safe to say that the bulk of the evidence
points to just one conclusion: for all that matters in practice, the
regional wage structure is very rigid with respect to regional labour
market disequilibria, both in the short- and in the long-run. Whatever
story one may tell about the extent of regional wage differentiation in a
descriptive sense, the flexibility of this very structure in the relevant
economic sense of reacting to market disequilibria is modest at best.
5. Intersectoral and Interindustrial Wage Rigidity
We shall tackle the question of intersectoral /-industrial wage rigidity with
basically the same theoretical and econometric apparatus as the one we
used for the analysis of interregional wage rigidity. Again, the
starting-point is a general dynamic framework of the type specified in
equation (7), with all relevant regional variables redefined in terms of
sectors or industries. Again, the general dynamic form can be rewritten
in alternative versions leading to the Engle-Granger (EG)- and the
Wickens-Breusch (WB)-model, with basically all technical comments made
on these models - both to theory and to estimation - equally applying to
regions and industries /sectors. As it was argued above, an intersectoral
labour market disequilibrium should be interpreted as a short- and
medium-run, not as a long-run phenomenon. Hence, a specification like
equation (8) can only make sense for regions, but not for sectors or
industries as the relevant long-term multiplier (G ) is not constrained to
zero. This is why we shall exclusively work with the specification given
by equation (11) which imposes the constraint G =0. Given all these
considerations and the limitations of the data, (z -z) is taken to be the
difference of the output (employment) ratios between industry/sector i
and the aggregate, with the output (employment) ratio defined as the
(log-) deviation of output or employment in the relevant industry or
44 sector from a (possibly higher-order) deterministic trend.
44 i
 :
Remember that (z -z) is thus trend stationary by definition.- 51 -
For the empirical analysis of interindustry and intersectoral wage
rigidity, we alternatively use two independant data sources, namely the
so-called industry statistics (1) and the national accounts (2). We shall
separately discuss the evidence destilled from each of these sources.
5.1. Estimates Based on Industry Statistics
Quarterly and annual reports on industry are the only data source in
West Germany which provides a consistent time series of wage and
production indices from 1950 to the present. As to the structural
disaggregation, the statistics follow the so-called SYPRO -framework
which, roughly speaking, divides total industry (excluding construction)
into mining and manufacturing, the latter consisting of four broad
industry groups: basic materials, investment goods, consumption goods
and food industries. These groups are again subdivided into a total
45 number of 35 single manufacturing branches. For technical reasons, we
shall restrict our analysis to five sectors - mining and the four
manufacturing industry groups - and to a selection of eight important
manufacturing industries which together comprise 60-70 % of all
manufacturing employees at any time of the sample period. . .,
As to the wage variable, we made parallel use of two different wage
indices which are of interest for our purposes: (i) the index of hourly
conntractual minimum wages (w_ with T for 'Tarif) and (ii) the index of
hourly earnings (wpp with EF for 'Effektiv'), both of an average worker
in West German manufacturing industry. (i) w_ is based on a
representative sample of important collective agreements in the respective
sector. It is defined as the pure time rate per hour of a worker with
maximum seniority (the highest 'age bracket' and the highest 'local pay
unit'). No supplementary benefits and premia are included, (ii) w_.p is
based on a representative sample of actual wage payments in
establishments with more than 10 employees. It is defined as the gross
earnings per hour which include the contractual minimum wage as well as
45
In particular, quite a few industry branches are so small that part
of the data needed is not published or otherwise accessible due to
reasons of data privacy protection.- 52 -
all supplementary benefits and premia which can be attributed to working
time, such as overtime premia, performance-related rates etc. ; excluded
are all benefits which are paid on an annual or irregular basis outside
the working time schedule (e.g. holiday money, gratifications, bonuses
etc. ). Both indices have a distinct meaning: with the usual statistical
caveats, w™ can be taken as a measure of the contractual minimum wage,
Wpp as a measure of the 'effective' wage. The difference of the growth
rate of W™ and w_ can be interpreted as a rough measure of a wage
drift which reflects both the difference between the effective and the
minimum wage per ordinary working hour, and the earnings effect of
overtime premia which raise the effective wage per 'total' working hour
(including overtime).
Note that our wage variables wpp and w_ avoid two of the conceptual
problems which have plagued the analysis in the case of interregional
wage differentiation. First, they obviously allow for a seperate estimation
of contractual as compared to effective wage rigidity across industries;
second, being Laspeyres-wage indices, they filter out that part of wage
growth which is a mere reflection of intersectoral movements of labour as
a consequence of structural change. On the other hand, they are still
possibly subject to an endogeneity bias due to an intersectoral
overlapping of the microcensus data base used for the calculation of the
indices, just as was the case in our interregional analysis. As there,
however, appropriate tests using strictly disjunct sectoral units indicated
47 that the bias from this source is likely to be negligible.
The output ratio for any sector and for manufacturing as a whole was
calculated on basis of the standard index of net industrial production,
the employment ratio on basis of the number of dependent status
employees. Both ratios are defined as the residuals from a regression of
46
For details, see i. a. the glossary in the bi-annual publication
Statistisches Bundesamt, Lange Reihen zur Wirtschaftsentwicklung,
latest issue 1990.
47
The design of these tests was analogous to that for regions. See
above in Part 4.- 53 -
the log of the industrial production index (the level of employment) on a
constant and three trend terms (linear, quadratic and cubic).
The pretesting for integration was limited to the two wage variables since
the output and employment ratios are trend stationary by definition.
Table 10 presents two Dickey-Fuller-test-statistics (DF1, DF.) from
autoregressions for the minimum and for the effective wage (in logs);
49 DF.. and DF. are defined as in Part 4, involving just a constant term
in the case of DF.. and a constant term plus linear, quadratic and cubic
trend terms in the case of DF.. The picture for DF.. is quite
unambiguous: 1(1) cannot be rejected at any of the usual significance
levels as most of the DF-statistics are in absolute terms below one, none
above 1.33. In contrast, 1(2) is rejected in most cases at least at the
10 %- and often at higher levels. As to DF., again, trend statidnarity is
a good approximation of the data generation process, both for levels and
for differences. At any rate, the wages in most industry groups and
single branches of manufacturing seem to have about the same time series
properties as the wage for manufacturing as a whole. Note also that the
difference between the respective test statistics for the minimum and the
effective wage is very small. Summing up, the test statistics do clearly
not preclude the application of an EG-model of the form (11) with the
wage index for total manufacturing as a proxy for the relevant aggregate
. . 50 wage level.
Table 11 and 12 present the results of the two-step EG-estimates of
equation (11), separately for the minimum and the effective wage. The
tables cover 13 cases each, 5 for the industry groups, 8 for the selected
Note that the estimates turned out to be very robust with respect to
the precise method of calculation of the output (employment) ratio. In
particular, adding a fourth-order or leaving out the third-order trend
term did hardly change the results.
49
See in particular equations (13) to (15).
As in Part 4 for regions, the test statistics do also point to the
co-integration equation as being a test setting for deterministic, not
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n equations (137 and (15)) for first-order tests and augmented Dickey-Fuller test
(unrestricted /\V"' in equations (13) and (15)) for second-order tests. Critical value for rejecting
the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5 %- (10 %-) level is about -2.93 (-2.60) for DF. (see
Fuller 1976, p. 373, Table 8.5.2., for n=50). For DF-, no such critical value is available, But if
it were, it would be higher in absolute terms than -3.50 (-3.18), the critical value for DF» as






















































































































































































































































































Notes: R"» = adjusted R
J; SE = standard estimation error; DW = Durbin-Watson-statistic; DF = Dickey-Fuller-statistic for
first-order autocorrelation of residuals; 6 = estimated coefficient of first-order autoregression; v, = lagged error
term from first step of EG-model. Table based on estimates of equation (11): first step specified" by equation (9)
with 9r= 0, second step by equation (10). Standard estimation errors of coefficients in parenthesis. For DW, the
critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about 0.755
(range of indifference from 0.484 to 0.755); see Sargan, Bhargava (1983), p. 157, Table I for T=51 and n=l. For DF,
critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about -3.365, at
the 10 %-level about -3.066 and at the 15 %-level about -2.864; see Phillips, Ouliaris (1990), p. 190, Table II b for


























































































































































































































































































2 = adjusted R
2; SE = standard estimation error; DW = Durbin-Watson-statistic; DF = Dickey-Fuller-statistic for
first-order autocorrelation of residuals; £ = estimated coefficient of first-order autoregression; v, = lagged error
term from first step of EG-model. Table based on estimates of equation (11): first step specified by equation (9)
with 9f- 0, second step by equation (10). Standard estimation errors of coefficients in parenthesis. For DW, the
critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about 0.755
(range of indifference from 0.484 to 0.755); see Sargan, Bhargava (1983), p. 157, Table I for T=51 and n=l. For DF,
critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about -3.365
the 10 %-level about -3.066 and at the 15 %-level about -2.864; see Phillips, Ouliaris (1990), p.
n=l.
at
190, Table II b for- 57 -
wage index for total manufacturing. The statistical message which can be
derived from the table, may be condensed to three major points.
• - 2
(i) As in the estimates for regions, the R is high all throughout
- mostly above 0.999 - and the standard estimation error (SE) very small
- usually well below 3 %, in some cases even below 1 %. The only notable
exception is the mining industry, one of the major losers of long-run
structural change, for which SE turns out to be much higher - 5. 15 %
for w_, and 4.25 % for wp. The long-run multipliers 9R fall again in a
rather narrow interval around one [0.94; 1.08], which, however, is not
quite as narrow as was the case in the regional part of our analysis.
Again, the standard estimation errors of 9R are extremely small so that,
in the vast majority of cases, 9R turns out to be significantly different
from one at the usual confidence levels.
(ii) With respect to co-integration, the relevant test statistics DW and DF
are - as usual - not conclusive. Nevertheless, a slight but systematic
disparity between the results in the two tables is discernible: for the
estimates with the minimum wage (Table 11), the DF-statistics do not
allow in any case to reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration at
any of the standard significance levels; on the other hand, the estimates
with the effective wage (Table 12) lead in general to perceptibly higher
DF-statistics and in five cases (out of 13), the null hypothesis can in
fact be rejected at a 15 %- (or a higher) significance level. The
DW-statistic qualitatively confirms this picture, although - again as
usual - its discriminatory power is estremely low. A glance over the
estimated autoregressive parameters p of the residuals confirms that no
strong conclusions should be drawn: only in a few industries - most
notably mining - is p so close to one that assuming anything else than a
unit root would be far-fetched. For most other industries, p is
somewhere between 0.7 and 0.85 for the minimum wage and between 0.5
and 0.8 for the effective wage - thus indicating that the tests allow for
a wide range of autoregressive structures including a unit root. Only the
slight disparity between the tables appears to be something of an
established fact, with the data speaking a bit more against co-integration
for w™ than for w_. Apparently, sectoral minimum wages as set in
collective agreements have a stronger element of what might be called
'autonomous inertia' which makes them less responsive to the- 58 -
economy-wide (deterministic or stochastic) trends than effective wages.
Why this should be so is a matter of speculation not to be dealt with at
this point. Note, however, that this 'autonomous inertia' does not imply
anything like a genuine flexibility of collective bargaining with respect to
specifically sectoral conditions; as we argued above, these conditions are
necessarily of a transitory nature and thus cannot be the driving force
behind a non-explained stochastic trend of the sectoral wage.
(iii) As to the short-run dynamics, the statistical picture, has features
which are quite familiar from the regional part of our analysis. The
short-run coefficient /3Q of Alog(w) is again highly significant and close
to one, usually in fact not far off the long-run coefficient Gfi as
estimated in the respective first step. As usual, the coefficient -(1-a..)
of the lagged level term v_1 is of a similar magnitude as the
autoregressive parameter p in the DF-test-estimate: for w_, a- falls in
the interval [0.7; 0.9], for Wg. in the interval [0.5; 0.8].
Most important for evaluating the extent of inter sectoral wage rigidity is,
of course, the coefficient 7^ of the disequilibrium variable A(OR-OR):
for w_, it turns out insignificant at the 5 %-level in all estimates and
'wrongly' signed in seven out of 13 cases. Replacing A(OR -OR)
by A(ER -ER), the results are no better: again, /3 „ is insignificant all
throughout and implausibly signed in six out 13 cases. Hence there is
not the slightest evidence of any reaction of sectoral minimum wages to
transitory sectoral disequilibria. The picture looks a bit different for the
estimates with wp: using A(OR
1-OR) as disequilibrium variable, ?» has
the expected sign in as many as eleven out of 13 cases, in five of which
it is also significant at the 5 %-level; replacing ACOR^OR) by ACER^ER),
ten out of 13 estimates of ?,. have the expected sign, albeit only three at
the 5 %-significance level. Hence, although the evidence is far from
conclusive at this point, the data seem to speak for a somewhat greater
flexibility of effective sectoral wages to sectoral disequilibria than of
minimum wages as set in collective bargaining.
To obtain again a quantiative impression of the extent of wage flexibility
involved, Table 13 presents the impulse effect of a 10 %-drop of the
sectoral output ratio relative to the aggregate one. Note that, by all
standards, such a 10 %-drop is an altogether dramatic sectoral event- 59 -
Table 13 - Impulse Effect on the Sectoral Wage (in
in the Sectoral Output Ratio














































Notes: Impulse effects calculated on basis of the respective estimates in
Tables 11 and 12.
which goes beyond even the dimension of the most powerful business
downturns of, say, 1967, 1974/75 and 1981/82. Two points can be
distilled from the numbers in the table. Firstly, as discussed above, the
flexibility of the minimum wage - if at all in the 'right' direction - is
weaker than that of the effective wage. Secondly, none of the numbers
indicates anything like a substantial impulse effect; after all, even the
maximum of a 2.2 %-differential in wage growth temporarily emerging
between mining and manufacturing as a reaction to a 10 %-drop of the
respective output ratio is very small by any sensible standard, not to
speak of the less than 1 %-reactions of wage growth in other sectors in
analogous situations. Hence one can hardly escape the conclusion that
the industrial wage structure, is very rigid with respect to sectoral
crises, probably even more so than the interregional wage structure with
respect to regional labour market disequilibria.- 60 -
5. 2. Estimates Based on National Accounts Statistics
From 1960 to the present, the West German national accounts statistics
provide a consistent data base of gross incomes from wages and salaries,
of value added at constant prices ('output') and of the level of
employment for broad sectors of economic activity as well as narrowly
defined branches of manufacturing. Combined with sectorally
disaggregated data on average annual working hours from a different,
but compatibel source, the national accounts statistics allow to calculate
the average hourly gross remuneration of employees (including social
security contributions of employers) which - for all that matters - is the
52
broadest available measure of an effective wage.
Of course, the national accounts statistics have some inherent
shortcomings; in particular, the data are not based on an index
calculation and thus reflect all effects of sectoral structural change on
hourly earnings. Nevertheless, as a second independent data source for
the empirical analysis of interindustrial and intersectoral wage rigidity,
the national accounts have also quite distinctive advantages. First, they
cover not only industry in the narrow sense (i.e. manufacturing and
mining), but also agriculture, construction and the private service
sectors. Second, given the extremely broad definition of the wage, they
may yield estimates for something like an upper bound of flexibility to
sectoral disequlibria; this is so to the extent that elements of
remuneration other than actual wage payments serve as hidden
instruments of flexibility. Finally, the national accounts data allow to
define sectoral and economy-wide wages in a way so as to make them
based on completely disjunct samples; this can be achieved by simply
calculating the aggregate wage as the economy-wide average excluding
the sector or industry branch under consideration.
The data on working hours has been provided by the Bundesanstalt
fur Arbeit. It is part of a data bank at the Institute of World
Economics. Thanks are due to H. Klodt for guidance on this matter.
52
Note that using a somewhat less broad measure (e.g., excluding
social securitiy contributions) did hardly affect the results.- 61 -
Keeping these data characteristics in mind, we use exactly the same
model for the national accounts as for the industry index statistics, with
the wage variable now defined as the average hourly gross earnings
(including social security contributions of employers) of a dependent
status employee and the output (employment) ratio defined as the
residual from a regression of the log of value added at constant prices
(the level of employment) on a constant and three trend terms (linear,
quadratic and cubic). Table 14 presents the results of the familiar
EG-model (equation 11) for seven broad sectors of economic activity
(agriculture and forestry, energy and mining, manufacturing,
construction, trade and commerce, transport and communications,
banking and insurance), with the relevant aggregate variables calculated
for the whole privat for-profit sector of the economy excluding the
sector under consideration. In turn, Table 15 covers 31 different
branches of manufacturing, with the aggregate defined as total
manufacturing excluding the branch under consideration. Note that the
standard pre-testing of the wage variables for their degree of integration
brought basically the same results as for the industry statistics, namely
1(1) to be accepted and 1(2) to be rejected for the vast majority of
cases, including the respective aggregate wage variables. To save on
54 space, we have not reprinted the test results in extra tables.
Glancing over the results of the two tables and picking out the most
characteristic features, which distinguish the estimates from those based
on industry index statistics, the following three points are worth noting:
(i) By and large, the explanatory power of the long-run estimates is
again very high, although not quite as high as before: in most cases,
the R
2 is below 0.999 though still above 0.990 whereas the SE falls in
the range 1 to 6 %, on average being around 2.6 %. These numbers
indicate that, in fact, the somewhat broader wage definition leaves more
Again, the precise definition of the trend did not matter much for
the outcome of the estimates.
54
Again, the data generation process could also be described by a
higher-order deterministic trend, with the cubic term usually being





























































































































































Notes: R"» = adjusted R
2; SE = standard estimation error; DW = Durbin-Watson-statistic; DF = Dickey-Fuller-statistic for first-
order autocorrelation of residuals; £ = estimated coefficient of first-order autoregression; v , = lagged error term
from first step of EG-model. Table based on estimates of equation (11): first step specified by equation (9) with Of
= 0, second step by equation (10). Standard estimation errors of coefficients in parenthesis. For DW, the critical value
for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about 1.156 (range of indifference
from 0.747 to 1.156); see Sargan, Bhargava (1983), p. 152, Table I for T=31 and n=l. For DF, critical value for
rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about -3.365, at the 10 %-level about
-3.066 and at the 15 %-level about -2.864; see Phillips, Ouliaris (1990), p. 190, Table II b for n=l. Significance level
of estimated coefficients (other than £ ): '**' not significantly different from zero at the 5 %- (or higher);.level; '*'
significantly different from zero at the 5 %-level, but not at the 1 %-level; all other coefficients significantly
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2 = adjusted R
a; SE = standard estimation error; DW = Durbin-Watson-statistic; DF = Dickey-Fuller-statistic for first-order
autocorrelation of residuals; C
 = estimated coefficient of first-order autoregression; v . = lagged error term from first
step of EG-model. Table based on estimates of equation (11): first step specified by equation (9) with 6f = 0, second step by
equation (10)1 For DW, the critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-
level about 1.156 (range of indifference from 0.747 to 1.156); see Sargan, Bhargava (1983), p. 152, Table I for T=31 and n=l.
For DF, critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about -3.365, at
the 10 %-level about -3.066 and at the 15 %-level about -2.864; see Phillips, Ouliaris (1990), p. 190, Table II b for n=l.
Significance level of estimated coefficients (other than g ): '**' not significantly different from zero at the 5 %- (or
higher) level; '*' significantly different from zero at the 5 %-level, but not at the 1 %-level; all other coefficients
significantly different from zero at the 1 %- (or higher) level.- 64 -
- albeit still not much - to be accounted for by the short-run dynamics
in the second step of the EG-procedure.
(ii) As usual, the co-integration test message is mixed, with the null
hypothesis (no co-integration) to be rejected at the 15 %- (or higher)
level in two out of seven cases for the broad sectors and in eleven out
of 31 cases for the manufacturing branches. Nevertheless, again as
usual, the autoregressive parameter p and the coefficient a- as estimated
in the second step of the EG-procedure remain well below 0.9, usually
even below 0.8 for the vast majority of cases so that no strong
conclusions should be drawn from DF- (and related) tests with
apparently very little power.
(iii) By and large, the estimated structural coefficients support prior
conjectures. To start with, the long-run multiplier 9R again turns out to
be close to one, although on average not quite as close as in prior
estimates. Basically the same holds for the short-run coefficient 0O of
Alog(w) in the second step of the EG-estimate. As to the important
coefficient T- of the short-run disequilibrium variable A(OR -OR), the
results on the whole point towards a negligible effect: for the broad
sectors, ?_ is positive in five out of seven cases, though significant at
the 5 %- (or higher) level only in one, namely construction. For the 31
manufacturing branches, 7- has the expected sign in only eleven out of
31 cases, with none of them at a 5 %- (or higher) significance level. Of
all sectors and industries, only construction and to a lesser extent
banking and insurance stand out with a quite sizeable wage flexibility.
In the case of construction, the familiar 10 %-drop of the industry's
output ratio relative to the private sector average - remember, a
spectacular cyclical event indeed - leads to a 5.5 %-cut of the average
per hour earnings of employees in construction. As construction is
known to be an industry with a particularly large extent of cyclical
fluctuations in productivity and working conditions, this exceptional
result does not come as a surprise. Note finally, that, if the employment
ratio is taken as a proxy for the labour market disequilibrium, the
outcome is qualitatively similar to the results obtained from estimates with
the output ratio. For the broad sectors, only three out of seven cases
have a positively signed coefficient 7-, with only two being significant at
the 5 %- or higher level; for the 31 manufacturing branches, the- 65 -
respective share is 14 out of 31, with just two of the 14 being significant
at the 5 %- (or higher) level. Again, construction as well as banking and
insurance stand out as sectors with a relatively high wage flexibility.
To sum up, the estimates clearly support all our prior conclusions on the
high degree of interindustrial and intersectoral wage rigidity. Remember
that the measure used for the wage was the broadest conceivable, at
least on an hourly basis. However, one may ask the question whether
elements of wage flexibility could be hidden in variations of working time
so that longer-term remunerations would be more flexible than the hourly
wage. In fact, this question can be tackled quite easily by reestimating
the EG-model with the wage variable defined as annual (not hourly)
earnings per employee.
Tables 16 and 17 present the results for these estimates in the format of
the corresponding tables 14 and 15. Focusing on the main points of
interest, namely the coefficients of the disequlibrium variables, our
prior conjectures as to the high wage rigidity are again supported, albeit
with some remarkable qualifications which do point to a non-negligible
cyclical role of working time as a means of earnings flexibility. For the
broad sectors, the coefficient T_ of the disequilibrium variable A(OR -OR)
is again positive in five out of seven cases, but significant at the
5 %-level in three (not just one as before), namely manufacturing,
construction, and banking and insurance. For the 31 manufacturing
branches, 7_ has the expected sign in as much as 24 out of 31 cases,
with 12 of them at a 5 %- (or higher) significance level. The arithmetic
average of the coefficients ?_ is in absolute terms 17.5 % for the seven
sectors - 9.3 % if construction is excluded - and 8.4% for the 31
manufacturing branches. Clearly, these are stronger estimated wage
effects than those we obtained before, although they still do not indicate
anything like a truely substantial wage moderation in a sector hit by a
sector-specific crisis: e.g., the familiar 10 %-relative drop of a sector
Note that the co-integration properties of the equations in tables 16
and 17 are more or less the same as those of the respective equations
in tables 14 and 15, as a comparison of the DW-statistics and the































































































































































Notes: R~* = adjusted K
1; SE = standard estimation error; DW = Durbin-Watson-statistic; DF = Dickey-Fuller-statistic for first-
order autocorrelation of residuals; £ = estimated coefficient of first-order autoregression; v , = lagged error term
from first step of EG-model. Table based on estimates of equation (11): first step specified by"equation (9) with &f
= 0, second step by equation (10). Standard estimation errors of coefficients in parenthesis. For DW, the critical value
for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about 1.156 (range of indifference
from 0.747 to 1.156); see Sargan, Bhargava (1983), p. 152, Table I for T=31 and n=l. For DF, critical value for
rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about -3.365, at the 10 %-level about
-3.066 and at the 15 %-level about -2.864; see Phillips, Ouliaris (1990), p. 190, Table II b for n=l. Significance level
of estimated coefficients (other than £ ): '**' not significantly different from zero at the 5 %- (or higher) level; '*'
significantly different from zero at the 5 %-level, but not at the 1 %-level; all other coefficients significantly
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2 = adjusted R>; SE = standard estimation error; DW = Durbin-Watson-statistic; DF = Dickey-Fuller-statistic for first-order
autocorrelation of residuals; € = estimated coefficient of first-order autoregression; v = lagged error term from first
step of EG-model. Table based on estimates of equation (11): first step specified by equation (9) with <9r = 0, second step by
equation (10). For DW, the critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-
level about 1.156 (range of indifference from 0.747 to 1.156); see Sargan, Bhargava (1983), p. 152, Table I for T=31 and n=l.
For DF, critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is at the 5 %-level about -3.365, at
the 10%-level about -3.066 and at the 15 %-level about -2.864; see Phillips, Ouliaris (1990), p. 190, Table II b for n=l.
Significance level of estimated coefficients (other than f ): '**' not significantly different from zero at the 5 %- (or
higher) level; '*' significantly different from zero at the 5 %-level, but not at the 1 %-level; all other coefficients
significantly different from zero at the 1 %- (or higher) level.- 68 -
output ratio would lead on average to a 0.84 %-relative wage cut in the
manufacturing branches and a 1.74 % wage cut in the broad sectors
(0.93 % if construction is excluded). Again, only construction stands out
with a sizeable wage flexibility, implying a 6.4 %-relative wage cut in
case of the above crisis event.
If the employment ratio is chosen as the disequilibrium proxy, the
results are similar though much less conclusive than with the output
ratio: for the broad sectors, four out of seven estimates of 7~ are
positive, with just one of them being significant at a 5 %- (or higher)
level; for the 31 manufacturing branches, the respective share is 19 out
of 31 with seven of them being significant at the 5 %- (or higher) level.
Somewhat surprisingly, it is now banking and insurance - not
construction - which stands out with the greatest extent of wage
flexibility.
6. Concluding Remarks
Our analysis has shown that structural wage rigidity is a pervasive
feature of labour markets in Germany: neither between regions nor
between sectors and industries do wages react to any significant degree
to respective labour market d is equilibria, be they temporary or
permanent. Minor exceptions - for regions: the isolated city-state of West
Berlin before German unification, for sectors: the construction
industry - are worth noting, but do clearly not disprove the rule. The
high structural wage rigidity shows up both in contractual minimum and
in effective wages, albeit slightly more so in the former than in the
latter, which points to at least a modest role for wage drift as a means
to achieve some post-contractual flexibility of the wage structure. If
longer-term earnings such as annual remunerations are considered,
variations in working time seem to add another element of flexibility,
though again, it is a rather modest one.
As always in econometrics, our results hinge upon the data used and the
methodology applied; they are thus subject to the many qualifications
discussed in the paper. Nevertheless, there are at least two good
reasons to believe that the main message of the results is fairly robust.- 69 -
First, the empirical picture has been remarkably uniform and
unambiguous, with virtually all estimates pointing towards high structural
wage rigidity independent of the data source and the model specification.
Second, the long-run equilibrium relationship and thus the long-term
co-movements of wages between different structural units turned out to
be very tight all throughout, in particular between regions. This means
that, even if the short- and medium-run disequilbrium dynamics has been
repeatedly misspecified, one would still have to conclude that the
structural wage effects of these disequilibria are likely to be rather small
- simply because not much 'autonomous' structural wage dynamics is to
be explained anyway. Hence the least controversial message of our
estimates by itself indicates a rather limited structural wage flexibility.
What are we to make of our results for economic policy in post-unification
Germany? The main conclusion looks quite obvious: for whatever reason,
German industrial unions and employers' associations, who are the main
agents at the wage bargaining table, regard structural disequilibria as
being beyond their competence and responsibility; in turn, market forces
- working via wage drift - are apparently insufficient to loosen the
straight jacket of a rigid wage structure to any substantial degree. If
this has been so in the last four decades, why should one expect it to
be different in an economically unified Germany which has basically taken
over the whole institutional framework of collective bargaining from prior
West Germany? In this sense, German unification may simply have
redefined the geographical entity over which wage rigidity is to prevail.
Hence, it should not be all that surprising to see collectively agreed
minimum wages in East Germany - and, in their tow, effective wages as
well - quickly move up to the level of the West as there are in fact set
to do in most industries up to the mid-1990s. The huge industrial
transformation, in which the economy of the East finds itself, is thus
implicitly interpreted by unions and employers' associations as nothing
but another regional crisis with costs of adjustment that have to be
largely borne by the state through a drastic subsidization of capital
investment, labour mobility and regional unemployment. Such-like crises
have happened many times in the West, although, of course, to a much
less dramatic extent, Thus interpreted, the efforts to equalize the wage
between West and East are simply the immediate consequence of a
traditional philosophy, with the only (gradual) difference being that the- 70 -
regional disequilibrium is of a vastly greater dimension than at any time
before.
A change of this philosophy could only be induced if the government
refrained from socializing the costs of structural crises and thus forced
unions and employers' associations to take over full responsibility for
mitigating any industrial or regional downturn. In fact, the sheer size of
the crisis in East Germany and the concommittant huge burden for public
finances would have given a unique historical opportunity to put moral
pressure on collective bargaining to allow for a substantial interregional
wage differentiation and thus to initiate a more self-sustained and less
government-sponsored industrial transformation. For whatever reason,
this chance was missed.
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